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The disclosure of non-GAAP earnings measures is a common form of voluntary corporate 
disclosure among firms involved in an initial public offering (IPO) process. Using a sample of 
21,004 analyst EPS forecasts calculated for 691 US IPOs completed between 2003 and 2012, it is 
examined how financial analysts perceive non-GAAP earnings information provided by managers 
in the prospectus filed with the SEC when calculating EPS forecasts. In particular, it is investigated 
whether IPO firms that disclose also non-GAAP earnings in the prospectus receive analyst 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
A key problem that companies face in the capital markets is how to attract funds in order 
to finance their operations. In particular, their operations are financed by investors that allocate 
their savings into equity investments with the expectation to generate positive returns. In turn, 
investors, before investing in companies’ stocks demand for relevant information from the 
companies. The information that companies provide to the public generally refers to corporate 
disclosure and it helps investors to decide and assess whether to invest their savings in a company 
rather than another company.  
The presence of corporate disclosure in the capital markets is important as it allows 
investors to be informed about the companies’ economic and financial situation. However, when 
considering capital markets, managers and investors value investments conditional on their own 
available information. Generally, it results that investors are the least informed party in a 
transaction as managers have more information about the business they run and thus, have 
incentives to boost the value of their company. These situations refer to information asymmetries 
or information gaps in the capital markets.  
Because of the existence of information gaps, information intermediaries, such as financial 
analysts help to solve information asymmetries problems. Consider investors that do not have a 
deep knowledge of the company or a financial sophistication in evaluating a company’s stock. In 
this framework, financial analysts have the expertise to interpret corporate financial information. 
In particular, financial analysts use financial reporting published by companies and engage in 
private information production that aims at uncovering firms’ superior and raw information (Healy 
& Palepu , 2001). In particular, corporate information flows among several participants in the 
capital markets and financial analysts are positioned in between companies and investors. 
Therefore, financial analysts act as filters, supplementing the amount of information disclosed by 
companies with other sources of information (i.e. analyst reports). Based on the information 
published by companies, analysts elaborate that information by forming earnings estimates, as well 
as target prices estimates and buy-sell recommendations for securities.  
Investors’ awareness and transparency are prerequisites for the functioning of capital 
markets. In particular, regulators and accounting standards ensure the existence of certain rules and 
the existence of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for corporate disclosure that 
aim at reducing information asymmetries (information gaps) between companies and investors. In 
particular, companies can communicate their economic and financial situation through mandatory 
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and voluntary disclosure. The former is part of the compulsory filings, such as periodic reports (i.e. 
10-Ks). The Security Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) implement regulations for mandatory reporting in US. The latter, instead, refers to 
voluntary forms of corporate disclosure that supplement mandatory disclosure. Consider when 
mandatory published information disclosed by companies is not enough to provide a clear picture 
of the company performance. For instance, the uniformity of accounting standards according to 
GAAP, which provide a common “language” for accounting, reduce flexibility for managers to 
reflect business differences in their companies’ financial reporting; therefore, voluntary disclosure 
can be a useful tool for managers in order to improve the quality of financial reporting to 
communicate to investors. However, managers can choose the accounting and disclosure policy to 
adopt.  The current study examines, non-GAAP earnings reporting as one form of voluntary 
disclosure from companies. In particular, non-GAAP earnings are GAAP earnings adjusted for 
items viewed as “unusual” or “non-recurring” or non-representative of ongoing operations. With 
regard to these alternative earnings, there exist two opposite views. In fact, on one hand managers 
claim that non-GAAP earnings exclude transitory and non-cash items, non-GAAP earnings 
improve the assessment for future cash flows and firm value (informativeness). On the other hand, 
critics argue that this alternative accounting practice is a symptom of managers’ opportunistic and 
incentive behavior push them to exclude certain items from GAAP earnings in arriving at the actual 
non- GAAP measure, depicting the company in the best way possible (opportunism). 
Furthermore, when considering particular business situations, such as initial public offering 
(IPO), regulations for information disclosure become stricter. For example, in the US setting, US 
GAAP and SEC dictate many accounting and disclosure requirements. This is due especially to the 
particular nature of IPO market, being very volatile and risky. In order to register an offering, a 
company files a registration statement with the SEC, typically using Form S-1. In particular, as 
soon as the company agrees with its investment bankers (underwriters), the prospectus is included 
in the Form S-1 and is used by the company to solicit potential investors. This is a legal document 
of the actual stock offering, which contains all the history of the company, the products, 
management and other relevant information available to investors. This document shows the risks 
to all the potential buyers who are buying the stock.  
One interesting aspect regarding the US IPO market and the information included in the 
prospectus is the use of non-GAAP metrics that describe the corporate financial performance. In 
particular, these measures are not expressly required, but it has become usual to include additional 
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operational and other metrics, such as non-GAAP earnings in the prospectus. This could be useful 
to help investors to understand better the issuer’s business.  
In the light of the above, the current study explores this type of disclosure in the IPO setting, 
and further investigates whether the presence of non-GAAP earnings in the prospectus affects the 
timing of forecasts of financial analysts. The data analyzed is a sample of 691 IPOs completed 
between 2003 and 2012, of which 239 IPO firms (34.60%) disclose non-GAAP earnings in their 
final prospectus. In particular, non-GAAP reporting for IPOs increases dramatically from about 
20.0% in 2003 to nearly 61% in 2012. Subsequently, for each IPO, analyst forecasts are retrieved. 
Therefore, the final sample includes 21,004 analyst forecasts calculated to estimate future EPS 
within two years after the offering for 691 IPOs from 2003 to 2012. 
For the purposes of this study, the number of days to coverage is calculated as the difference 
in trading days between the date of forecast and the date of the offering. This corresponds to the 
variable that describes the timing of forecasts for analysts. However, not all days to coverage are 
considered, only the lowest days to coverage of each analyst for each IPO. Therefore, the lowest 
days to coverage corresponds to the first day or activation date in which the analyst made the first 
forecast. This procedure gives 6,486 first activation dates of analysts. Furthermore, the timing in 
which several analysts calculate forecasts for the first time for the same IPO were investigated. In 
particular, analysts are ranked from the earliest to the latest depending on the date in which they 
are active for the first time. 
From the statistical analysis of univariate tests of differences, it emerged that IPO firms 
who disclose non-GAAP earnings in their prospectus receive quicker analyst coverage from the 4th 
until the 9th analyst in the ranking. In particular, the difference is significantly greater than zero 
from the 4th to the 9th ranking, suggesting that non-GAAP stocks receive coverage from the 4th until 
the 9th analyst earlier than only GAAP stocks within two years from the offering. Moreover, given 
that the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings in the prospectus is likely to be influenced by the size 
of firm, IPOs firms are divided according quartiles of the size. Firstly, it emerged that difference 
in mean between the size of non-GAAP IPOs and GAAP IPOs were significantly greater than zero, 
suggesting a relation between the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings and the size of the firm. 
However, interestingly it emerged that analysts in the first ranking (earliest analysts) are active 
earlier when they cover non-GAAP IPOs belonging to the fourth quartile for the size (larger firms). 
Finally, by developing a multivariate regression analysis it results that the coefficient for 
the dummy variable, indicating the presence of non-GAAP earnings in the prospectus, is negative 
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and significant. This suggest that the presence of non-GAAP earnings in the prospectus decreases 
























2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
 
2.1 INFORMATION PROBLEM IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS 
Capital markets are a large system of different types of participants, including companies, 
investors, regulators, financial institutions and informational intermediaries. On one side, 
companies demand for capitals to finance their projects and operations and, on the other side, 
investors1 look for investment opportunities. In this setting, the difficult question for all companies 
is that they need funds to finance their operations and, in turn, investors rationally want to finance 
those operations in which they see profitable investments in order to gain positive returns. At the 
same time, it is not easy for investors to find the right investment opportunities (suitable for them) 
and assess their actual future profitability. Perhaps investors may not have the means or the 
expertise in order to find the right opportunities or necessary information for assessing the 
investment; therefore, the allocation of saving towards good investments opportunity is a 
challenging task.  
With this in mind, buyers must know what sellers are offering and therefore markets require 
information for their functioning. If no information is provided transactions are more likely to not 
occur. Conversely, if transactions occur, the prices at which they occur will be distorted because 
buyers are not well informed. Therefore, if proper and useful information were not provided, 
investors would prefer not to finance companies because they are not willing to bear risks, such as 
losing their money in a bad investment.  
In their contributions, Akerlof (1970), Jensen and Meckling (1976), in describing the 
working mechanism of capital markets and their efficiency, they also explain how insufficient 
information affects participants in the market and discuss the presence of information asymmetries 
in the capital markets, in which the information is not equally shared between individuals. On one 
hand, some individuals have more information and, on the other hand, other individuals undergo 
this imperfection because of inadequate information. Capital markets experiences two types of 
information asymmetries: adverse selection and moral hazard. In particular, adverse selection 
indicates the situation in which one party in a negotiation has relevant information the other party 
                                                 
1 Although there are several types of investors, the focus in this study is on equity investors. 
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does not; and moral hazard means that one party in a transaction has the opportunity to assume 
additional risks that negatively affect the other party.  
Firstly, Akerlof (1970) analyses the more general situation of adverse selection when an 
offer conveys negative information about what it is being offered. The most famous example is the 
market for used cars. Suppose that used cars have different qualities, from the worst or “lemons” 
(the cars that always are breaking down) to the very best “plums” (the most reliable cars). The 
sellers know the quality of their cars, but suppose the buyer cannot tell which cars are lemons and 
which are plums; this is a model of asymmetric information as sellers have more information than 
buyers do2. The same example of Akerlof (1970) can be introduced in the context of companies 
and investors. Both managers and investors value investments conditional on their own available 
information. Facing information or “lemons” problem, investors are the least informed part because 
managers typically have better information than investors do about the actual value of the 
investment of the business they run. Secondly, in the case of moral hazard, managers have 
incentives to make decision that are inappropriate from the viewpoint of investors, such as 
investment or operating decisions that are harmful to interest of outside investors (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  
Summing up, the difficulty in matching savings and investments comes from three reasons. 
First, managers have better information than investors on the value of business investments 
opportunities. Second, managers have an incentive to boost the value of their ideas. Third, investors 
sometimes do not have the financial sophistication to assess various investment opportunities. 
The presence of information asymmetries and deficiencies in the capital markets can be 
extended towards different directions. Consider the different information gaps occurring between 
the company and the market as a whole, including then all company’s stakeholders. There can be 
identified six information gaps within the corporate environment, including perception gap, 
understanding gap, information gap, reporting gap, quality gap and value gap. Figure 1 provides 
an overview of information gaps, highlighting how these gaps affect the management of the 
company, investors and the market as a whole. In particular, a perception gap occurs if the utility 
                                                 
2 Given that buyers cannot tell the difference between a lemon and a plum, they will not be willing to pay more than 
what an average quality car is worthy. However, since buyers are willing to pay only for average quality cars, sellers 
with the highest quality car will exit the market. When the highest quality car exit the market the average quality of 
car falls, which reduces the price the buyers are willing to pay even more. That causes sellers of the next high quality 
car to drop out the market as well. At the end of what sometimes called the “death spiral”, the market collapses and 
buyers conclude that they would not buy any car that is offered for sale (Akerlof, 1970). 
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of information provided by the company is perceived differently by the market. An understanding 
gap exists if different stakeholders and management assess information data in different ways. An 
information gap tells that information (i.e. through performance data) is not communicated to the 
market adequately. A quality gap means that the information about performance is not reliable. A 
reporting gap occurs when relevant information is not disclosed, such as business goals, which 
enables investors to draw their conclusions on whether the investment is worth. Finally, the value 
gap reflects the cumulative impact of all the other gaps and represents the different between the 
company’s current market value and management’s perception of what the value should be 




















These gaps are common. Consider an investor who has two choose whether to invest 
between two securities of two different companies. Each company then reports one financial 
measure useful for the investor to decide in which securities to invest. For instance, it may happen 
Source: (Schuster & O'Connell, 2006) 
 
Source: (Schuster & O'Connell, 2006) 
 
Figure 3 -Source: (Schuster & O'Connell, 2006) 
 
Source: (Schuster & O'Connell, 2006) 
Figure 1-Analysis of various information gaps 
 
Figure 2-Analysis of various information gaps 
8 
 
that the first company calculates the same financial measure, but does not include written relevant 
information that explains the method used in the calculation (reporting gap). It may happen that 
the second company provides a financial measure never reported before by the same company 
(perception gap) with subsequent doubts for the investor. 
To remedy to some of these gaps in between investors and companies there are information 
intermediaries (Healy & Palepu , 2001). In particular, information intermediaries, such as 
financial analysts, rating agencies, industry experts and financial press, collect, organize, and 
distribute information disclosed by companies to their clients (Womack, 2002) and are relevant 
figures for solving problems of information asymmetries. Nevertheless, there also exist financial 
intermediaries3, such as small and mid-large financial institutions, which are important in the 
functioning of the capital markets because they act as middlemen between savers (households) and 
borrowers (companies) as well as offer a range of several financial services. 
The presence of intermediaries adds value by helping investors distinguish good 
investments from bad ones. Healy and Palepu (2001) provide an insight about how capital and 
information flow within the capital markets and illustrates how this mechanism works. Figure 2 
illustrates a schematic representation. On one side, the flow of capital from savers to business ideas 
(left side), which can flow directly from savers to businesses or through financial intermediaries, 
such as banks, venture capital funds, and insurance companies. On the other side, information 
intermediaries implement the flow of information from businesses to savers (right side). However, 
firms communicate with investors both directly through media, such as reports and press release, 
or through intermediaries, such as financial analysts.  
Figure 2 displays also the presence of regulators within the circuit of capital and information 
flows. In particular, on one side, capital markets regulators substantially set the rules for the 
functioning of the capital markets, the standards for corporate public financial reporting, the rules 
for investment, and the regulations for securities exchanges. On the other side, accounting and 
auditing regulators formulate Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Regulators 
and standards, respectively, assure the presence of certain rules, minimum disclosure requirements 
and appropriate accounting practices in order to reduce the information gaps between companies 
and investors.  
                                                 
3 Financial intermediaries, as small, mid-large financial institutions. They can be divided into banking financial 
intermediaries (commercial banks) and non-banking financial intermediaries (investment banks, insurance companies, 
leasing companies). In particular, the former act as middlemen between savers and borrowers. Their main task is to 
accept deposits and then use those funds to offer loans to their customers. The latter, instead, offer a range of other 






In this setting, the functioning of both the information intermediaries and financial 
intermediaries depends on financial reporting. In particular, information intermediaries add value 
by either improving the credibility of financial reports (as auditors do), or by analyzing the 
information in the financial statements (as analysts and the rating agencies do). Financial 
intermediaries rely on the information in the financial statements, and supplement this information 
with other sources of information, to analyze investment opportunities (Palepu et al., 2003).  
In conclusion, the information problem in the capital markets, addressed in this paragraph, 
introduces the important figure of financial analysts and their role in the functioning of capital 
markets. 
2.2 ONE SOLUTION FOR INFORMATION PROBLEM: FINANCIAL ANALYSTS  
Because of the “lemons” problems, there is demand to engage private information 
production. Consider investors (in particular small investors) that have not the necessary 
competence and expertise to interpret the raw information provided by the companies. The 
Source: Healy & Palepu (2001) 
 
Source: Healy & Palepu (2001) 
 
Source: Healy & Palepu (2001) 
 
Source: Healy & Palepu (2001) 
 
Source: Healy & Palepu (2001) 
 
Source: Healy & Palepu (2001) 
 
Source: Healy & Palepu (2001) 
 
Source: Healy & Palepu (2001) 
Figure 2-Financial and information flows in a capital market economy 
 
Figure 2-Financial and information flows in a capital market economy 
10 
 
presence of information intermediaries, such as financial analysts aims at uncovering firms’ 
superior and raw information (information gap). Whether on one hand, the same firms disclose 
public available information on the other hand financial analysts provide financial information as 
well. In particular, financial analysts are themselves users of financial reporting issued by the 
companies and then they engage in private information production (Healy & Palepu , 2001). 
Financial analysts play principally two roles in the capital markets. Firstly, they reduce 
information asymmetries and contribute to informational efficiency between managers and outside 
investors by generating relevant information. Secondly, they externally monitor of managerial 
activities and decision-making process as they have access to deeper knowledge for analyzing 
corporate data (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The process through which analysts present their reports about stocks commonly refers to 
“analyst coverage” or “analyst following”. Analyst coverage has become an important an important 
component of stocks’ valuation and investment process as whole. Investors ask for information 
that is more accurate about companies and financial analysts provide this service.  In particular, 
when performing their dissemination of information (analyst coverage), financial analysts: 
 gather new information on the industry or individual stock from customers, suppliers and 
firm managers; 
 analyze these data and form earnings and target prices estimates, plus they give 
recommendations; and  
 present recommendations and financial models to buy-side client through written reports 
(Michaely & Womack, 1999). 
 
Financial analysts tend to be specialized on the type of institution they work for providing 
a variety of services in brokerage houses, mutual funds, investment banks, pension funds or even 
independent companies. Depending on the type of clients they work for, typically analysts are 
grouped in sell side analysts and buy side analysts4.  
 Sell-side analysts, who are usually employed by brokerage houses and clients. Their major 
task is to analyze listed companies and provide equity research. They write in-depth 
research reports and their earnings forecasts, recommendations and target prices are 
available to the public as well. In particular, sell-analysts provide their estimates of financial 
                                                 
4 For the purposes of this research, the primary focus is on sell-side analysts. 
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information to the Institutional Broker Estimate System5 (IBES). IBES standardized 
forecasted financial information and standardized summary data are then available in the 
database, against fees payments, to subscribers such as brokerage houses, buy-side analysts, 
other large investors, researchers and media. 
 Buy-side analysts, who are usually employed by asset management companies and make 
internal recommendations and forecasts exclusively to money managers.  
 
The extant literature finds that equity research analysts produces information that matters 
to investors and individuates some positive effects that analyst coverage produces in the capital 
markets, including mitigation of agency problems, positive market reaction, liquidity improvement, 
change in investor recognition, reduction of cost of capital, confidence. Conversely, other evidence 
shows some negative effects deriving from analyst coverage, including biasness related to 
underwriting relationships and overconfidence.  
 
Mitigation of agency problems. The separation of ownership and control in a company spotlight 
financial analysts’ ability to mitigate agency problems. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
analyst activities restrict managers’ self-interest and non-value maximizing activities; therefore, 
they lessen information asymmetries between managers and outsider investors with positive effects 
on the firm’s ability to raise capital.  
 
Positive market reaction. The market interprets positively analyst initiation6 of coverage. Initial 
recommendations made by new analysts for the first time have positive impact on stock prices. In 
particular, initiation abnormal returns are more positive than abnormal returns to recommendations 
by sell-side analysts who already cover the stock (Irvine, 2003).  
 
Liquidity improvement. The greater analyst coverage the more informed traders in the market. An 
increase of analyst coverage shows liquidity improvements due to enhanced competition between 
informed parties. It results in a lower bid-ask spread and lower rates of return, because of relatively 
liquid stock due to higher trading (Brennan & Tamarowski, 2000).Additionally, Irvine (2003) finds 
that strong buy analysts’initial recommendations attract more liquidity, making the effect of 
                                                 




liquidity improvements depending also on the level and type of analysts’ recommendation rather 
than just the initian itself.  
 
Change in investor recognition. Investors react favorably to coverage initiation because in that 
way analysts promote stocks to more investors. By raising investor awareness, the increased analyst 
coverage has an incremental price effect, since investors pay more attention to stocks that analysts 
cover. Investors react favorably to initiations because they understand that analysts create value for 
firms by promoting the stocks to more investor, but at the same time analysts to initiate coverage 
on stocks that they anticipate to have higher investor recognition (Li & You, 2015). 
 
Reduction of cost of capital. Analysts are themselves users of the financial information disclosed 
by companies. Companies may benefit from having many analysts because analysts increase the 
precision of information and this lowers the companies’ cost of capital. For instance, Botosan 
(1997), analyzing the relation between disclosure level and cost of capital, provides evidence that 
firms with low analyst following, greater disclosure from companies reduce on average the cost of 
capital.  
 
Confidence. The depth of analyst coverage has significant effects on investors’ decisions-making, 
as analysts can attract investors’ attention to particular securities they follow. On one hand, 
investors feel more confident and informed on whether to invest in highly covered stocks, as they 
are willing to buy securities they feel more familiar with. On the other hand, firms experience a 
reduction in their external financing. In fact, firms with higher analyst coverage are associated with 
higher external financing and lower cost of capital (Doukas, Kim, & Pantzalis, 2008). 
 
Biasness in underwriting relationships. The purpose to win investment-banking businesses may 
compromise the analyst’s objectivity because of conflict of interest. On one hand, brokerage 
operations such as equity research are motivated to maximize profit from commissions and spreads 
by providing clients information. On the other hand, investment-banking services aim at 
completing transactions, such as IPOs, SEOs and M&A for new and current clients. Therefore, 
brokerage house operations lead to conflicts when the same financial institution provides both 
analyst research and investment-banking services (i.e. underwriting). In particular, when referring 
to underwriting operations, analysts are grouped in affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. The former 
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are employed by the investment banks that provide underwriting services, whereas the former are 
external and do not have any kind of relationship with the underwriter bank. Sources of bias, 
towards a moremoptimistic view in forecasting earnings and making recommendations, argued by 
researchers are the fear of jeopardizing potential investment banking business, the fear of losing 
access to management information and seeking to generate trading commissions (McNichols & 
O'Brien, 1997). Consider the underwriting business of an investment bank. This business needs 
large investment in developing relationships with the issuers. Consequently, as a matter of fact the 
investment bank (underwriter) does not welcome negative reports from analysts who work within 
the underwriter’s research team.  Evidence shows that affiliated analysts who follow a company, 
and work for the investment bank that provides underwriting services for the same company, show 
more favorable recommendations or optimistic forecasts than those ones made by unaffiliated 
analysts (Dugar & Nathan, 1995; Lin & McNichols , 1998). 
 
Overconfidence. In contrast with the evidence that greater coverage attract investors, with positive 
liquidity effects and enhanced competition between informed traders, excessive analyst coverage 
boosts investor optimism causing stock prices to trade above their fundamentals (Doukas et al., 
2005). This overvaluation is associated with stronger analyst coverage driven by investment 
banking incentives and analyst interest in generating trading commissions. As consequence, this 
“hyping up” of stocks provides the opportunity to issue overpriced stocks, because managers can 
exploit favorable market conditions in issuing equities (Chang et al., 2006).  
 
 
2.3 TIMING OF ANALYST EARNINGS FORECASTS 
Investors use analyst earnings forecasts to predict a firm’s future cash flows and they are 
more useful if they are accurate and timely. Logically, the more the amount of information available 
to analysts the more accurate forecasts are. On one hand, if analysts wait longer to issue forecasts 
they would have more information in predicting earnings. For instance, by gathering information 
from their peers’ forecasts, analysts may improve their own forecast accuracy. On the other hand, 
investors value timely information for their trading. Therefore, delayed forecasts are more likely 
to deprive investors to gain from trading. 
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The literature offers two theories that link analysts’ forecast accuracy with the timing of 
their forecasts: the herding theory and the trade-off theory. It is still unclear which theory describes 
the best individual analysts’ behavior in forecasting earnings; however, the herding theory is the 
most established and makes good predictions.  In particular:  
 the herding theory argues that analysts who are more capable act earlier (basing their 
forecasts on their private information) and less capable analysts subsequently herd, perhaps 
in order to hide their non-capability (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990; Trueman, 1994). The idea 
underlying these models is that more recent analyst forecasts are more accurate than 
forecasts issued earlier because of the timing advantage of more recent forecasts. This is 
attributable to the fact that analyst can observe other analysts’ forecasts issued before as 
well as public information disclosed by firms. 
 the trade-off theory argues that analysts with more precise private information forecasts 
earlier and those with higher learning ability forecast later. Therefore, both earlier and later 
forecasts are informative but for different reasons. Guttman (2010) considers the active 
learning of analysts as a benefit of waiting. In his model, analysts face a trade-off between 
the timeliness and the accuracy in their forecasts linked to both analysts’ private 
information and their learning ability. In equilibrium, analysts with higher precision of 
initial private information tend to forecast earlier and analyst with higher learning ability 
tend to forecast later (Guttman, 2010). 
 
On a timeline basis, sell-side analysts perform two tasks when they predict earnings: 
information discovery and information analysis. The latter is the discovery of private 
(idiosyncratic) information and the former is the interpretation of public information. On one hand, 
it follows that if analysts primarily discover and publish material private information, then analyst 
reports will tend to pre-empt subsequent corporate disclosures. On the other hand, if analysts 
primarily interpret existing public information in their reports, then corporate disclosure that are 
information rich will tend to be followed by more informative analysts report because there is more 
information for analysts to analyze; therefore, the two reports tend to reinforce each other (Chen & 
Cheng , 2010). Nevertheless, the two time lengths in which analysts make discovery of private 
information and interpretation of public information are unknown. Based on this, Chen and Cheng 
(2010) study the association between a company’s absolute stock return at the earnings 
announcement date and the absolute stock returns in the near week in which analysts release their 
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forecasts. It emerges that before the earnings announcement (up to 30 trading days) analysts engage 
in information discovery and after one week from the earnings announcement (up to 5 trading days) 
analysts focus on analyzing public disclosure. Finally, they find that information discovery 
(interpretation) dominates in the week before (after) firms announce their earnings.  
Similarly, using a sample of firms whose fiscal years end between 1999 and 2008, Keskek 
et al. (2014) collect from IBES individual analyst forecasts of annual earnings issued during a fiscal 
year, identify the earnings announcement date that is closest to each forecast, and count the number 
of trading days between the forecast and the announcement7.  
They label days -30 to -1 as the “information discovery” phase, days from 0 to +4 as the 
“information analysis” phase and days from +5 to +29 as the “post-analysis” phase. Similarly to 
Chen and Cheng. (2010), they observe variation in analyst forecasting activity during the year. 
Figure 3 displays the distribution of analyst forecasts of fiscal year t’s earnings in the 60-trading-
day windows around earnings announcement for the year t-1 (4th quarter) and the first three quarters 
of year t. In particular, analysts activity increase slightly in the “information discovery” phase, 
declines gradually within 10 days before the announcement, suddenly has its peak at the earnings 
announcement day and finally drops significantly in the next days (the lowest point is after 30 days 
from the announcement). As it is possible to notice, this cycle is repeated four times and all the 
times the same trends occur.  
                                                 
7 The final sample consists of 712,946 individual analyst forecasts around 97,005 earnings announcement events 






They also measure forecast accuracy improvements (improvement ratio). This measure tells 
how more accurate is individual analyst forecast than peer’s outstanding forecasts, proxied by the 
most recent forecast by a peer analyst8. To verify how relative9 forecast accuracy improvements 
change over the two phases (information discovery and information analysis), they split the 
information discovery and information analysis phases into sub-phases around the earnings 
announcement date. Therefore: 
 Information discovery: early period (days -30 to -16) and late period (days -15 to -1); 
 Information analysis: early period (days 0 to 2) and late period (days 3 to 4) 
                                                 
8 The mean estimate is used if more than one analyst issues a forecast for the firma on that day (Keskek et al., 2014).  
9 They use relative forecast accuracy measure that allows focusing on the forecast’s contribution to overall forecast 
accuracy. They do not use absolute forecast accuracy (the difference between a forecast and the actual earning) because 
it might reflects analysts’ collective accuracy at the time of the forecast (Keskek et al.,2014).  
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Figure 3 - The timing of annual earnings forecasts 
 




Figure 4 groups all earnings announcements events and plots the daily mean of the 
percentage of forecasts from all analysts on a given trading day that are more accurate than peer’s 
outstanding forecasts (improvement ratio). In particular, the percentage rises at 53% about 25 days 
before the upcoming announcement and has a downward trend until the announcement date. The 
maximum peak occurs at the announcement date (60%), drops quickly 1 day after at 45% and 
steadily declines until 5 days after the announcement. Finally, this pattern shows that analyst 
forecast quality decreases over both the information discovery and analysis phase, suggesting that 
analysts with superior information tend to forecast earnings earlier in both phases than their peers.  
In conclusion, two aspects follow about forecast timing for analyst decisions. First, 
brokerage houses can take advantage from a timely forecast by triggering greater trading and 
commissions, which in turn will benefit the analyst. Second, forecast accuracy may be sacrificed 
by reducing opportunities for analyst to observe other analysts’ forecasts and private information.  
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Figure 4 - Proportion of forecasts that are more accurate than peers’ outstanding forecasts 
 
Figure 4 - Proportion of forecasts that are more accurate than peers’ outstanding forecasts 
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2.4 COMPANIES’ CHARACTERISTICS RELATED TO ANALYST COVERAGE 
Because of the important role analyst research plays in informing investors, academics have 
long been interested in the factors determining analyst coverage. A group of studies tries to explain 
the effects of certain variable s on the number of analysts following a firm. There are some possible 
explanations for analyst following and the evidence suggests that a number of firm’s characteristics 
influences the number of analysts following a firm. In this study, some of the determinants are 
discussed including trading volume, firm size, percentage of share retained, market-to-book ratio, 
accruals quality, intangibles, underpricing and corporate disclosure.  
 
Trading volume. Brokers must carefully assess the benefits of covering a particular stock against 
another one when deciding how to allocate analyst services, such as equity research. Brokers 
generally earn from the expected commission revenues from trading and potential financial and 
consulting revenues from the covered company. The higher trading volume created by analysts the 
larger broker’s commissions which analysts work for. Analyst following and trading volume 
should be positively related because brokerage commission are proportional to the trading volume 
generated by the sale of securities. In particular, brokerage houses compete each other to generate 
higher trading volume and offer equity research as service to their clients in generating trading 
business. Nevertheless, an indirect effect follows. Based on these arguments, analysts’ incentive to 
generate trading commissions is the driver for the availability and accuracy of analysts’ reports. 
Hayes (1998) identifies that forecasts for future expected high-performance stocks are likely to be 
more accurate than poorly stocks performance forecasts, due to more commitment in equity 
research.  
 
Firm size. The firm size refers to the total market value of the firm’s stock and is an important 
factor that affects analyst following of firms. First, by focusing on larger firms analysts can provide 
their employer more valuable future projects compared to smaller firms. Evidence shows a positive 
relation between the size of the firm and the number of analysts following the firm. Bushan (1989) 
argues that, on one hand, investors find private information more valuable about larger firms than 
the same information about smaller firms. On the other hand, analysts have incentives to focus on 
larger firms because these firms stimulate the interest of many investors and analysts can benefiting 




Percentage of shares retained. The percentage held by insiders is supposed to be negatively related 
to the number of analysts following a firm. This assumption follow by the fact that the demand for 
coverage comes from outsider investors, thus when the percentage of insider ownership increases, 
analyst coverage lowers. Moreover, the cost of analyst coverage may be more costly if analysts 
have to make more effort in equity research because insiders may not reveal so much information; 
therefore analysts tend to provide less coverage (Bushan, 1989).  
 
Price-to-Book ratio. A high price-to-book (market-to-book) ratio means that the current market 
value of the company is relatively higher compared to the book value of the firm. Investors look at 
the high market-to-book ratio companies because they have higher potential growth. According to 
McNichols and O’Brien (1997), analysts shy away from disclosing opinions for companies in 
which they do not see favorable perspectives, therefore analyst tend to cover firms by providing 
earnings forecasts and recommendations for securities about their beliefs are favorable10.  
 
Accruals quality. Accruals adjust or shift the recognition of cash flows over time. In particular, 
accruals are based on estimates and assumptions, so that potential estimation errors result in lower 
accruals quality, noisier signal about the firm value and worsening of asymmetric information 
(Dechow & Dichev, 2002). It follows that the demand for private information for lower quality 
accruals firms attract more analysts seeking for mispriced securities to cover. 
 
Intangibles assets. Companies with substantial intangible assets, sometimes not entirely 
recognized in the balance sheet, are assumed to have more information asymmetry and more 
uncertain market value. High intangibles firms share price does not reflect accurately its 
fundamental value and analyst activities can yield profitable trading business and higher 
commissions. Evidence shows that significantly more analysts cover companies with higher 
research and development expenses and higher advertising expenses. This is because intangible 
assets are generally unrecognized. Estimates of the value of these assets are absent, so that 
companies with more intangible assets have less informative prices and analysts can gain from this 
mispriced securities (Barth et al., 2001). 
                                                 
10 McNichols and O'Brien (1997) document the self-selection behavior, in which analysts assign to stocks they have 
just added to their lists of followed stocks are heavily weighted toward "Strong Buy" recommendations, compared 
with ratings of stocks with previous recommendations. This is consistent with analysts preferentially adding stocks 
whose future prospects they view most favorably. 
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Underpricing. One of the determinant of the analyst following relies in a particular situation the 
company face. In particular, underpricing (determinant) is associated with the market of IPOs. The 
underpricing indicates the pricing of an IPO below its market value. Evidence shows that on 
average, the first-day return of US IPOs form 1980 to 2015 is 18% (Ritter, 2016). The first-day 
return measures the degree of the underpricing, intended as the percentage change that the offer 
price of an IPO undergoes at the end of the first trading day on the market. With regard to the 
attention paid by analysts, more underpriced IPOs attract more analysts. Analysts, in turn, tend 
systematically to overestimate the future earnings for the fiscal year of these companies. In 
particular, as the length of the time between making the forecast and fiscal year for which the 
forecast is made increases, so does the forecast error (Rajan & Servaes , 1997). 
 
Corporate disclosure. Ex-ante it is not obvious whether analysts would prefer following firms that 
disclose more information rather than less, raising the doubts on whether financial disclosure are 
substitutes or complements in mitigating information asymmetry. In particular, it depends whether 
analysts behave as information intermediaries or information providers (Bushan, 1989; Lang & 
Lundholm, 1996). In the first case, the flow of information goes from firms to analysts, who in turn 
elaborate the information and transmit it into the capital markets. In the second case, conversely, 
analysts compete directly with firm-provided disclosure. On one side, Lang & Lundholm (1996) 
find that analysts follow firms with more informative disclosure practices, indicating company-
provided disclosure policies as an important determinant of analyst following. More forthcoming 
disclosure policies, especially in the investor relations area, attract more analysts, either because 
an increasing demand for analyst reports or because disclosures reduce analysts’ cost of supplying 
them.  On the other side, services of financial analysts become more valuable as accounting 
practices provide less signals about the firm value. In particular, Lehavy et al. (2011) show that 
analyst following, the amount of effort incurred to generate analysts’ reports and their 
informativeness are greater for firms with less readable 10-Ks. Presumably, less readable 10-Ks 
are associated with greater dispersion, lower accuracy and greater overall uncertainty in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. In conclusion, less readable communication and greater collective effort made 
by analysts for firms with less readable disclosures is symptom of increasing demand for analyst 




2.5 ONE KEY DETERMINANT FOR ANALYST COVERAGE: CORPORATE 
DISCLOSURE  
Previously, among the factors affecting analyst coverage, corporate disclosure has been 
pointed out one of the important determinants that influences the number of analysts following a 
firm (Lang & Lundholm, 1996). Financial analysts are inside the process of corporate disclosure 
and they act as filters between the company and investors. Based on the documents disclosed by 
companies, they elaborate the information provided and make it more “readable” for investors. In 
this setting, it is worth to discuss what sources of disclosure used by analysts come from.  
By definition, corporate disclosure refers to communication of information by insiders of 
public companies towards outsiders, aimed at communicating firm performance and governance to 
outside investors (Healy & Palepu , 2001). On one hand, insiders are managers and majority 
shareholders and, on the other hand, outsiders are investors as well as minority shareholders, 
regulators, information intermediaries and all other stakeholders. However, corporate managers 
can still choose which accounting and disclosure policies to adopt. Depending on the policy they 
adopt, it will result more or less difficult for external users of financial reports to understand the 
real situation of the company. Companies can communicate with investors principally through two 
forms of corporate disclosure: mandatory and voluntary disclosure. 
Firstly, companies provide mandatory disclosure as part of obligatory filing such as 
periodic reports (10-K, 10-Q) and significant events (8-K). In US, mandatory disclosure, required 
for public companies, constitutes the core of the securities regulation. In particular, these 
requirements are spelled out in the Securities Act of 1933, the Exchange Act of 1934 and the 
Security Exchange Commission (SEC) implements these regulations. According to these 
regulations, public companies must provide detailed financial information on a regular basis. These 
include, for instance, annual basis disclosures (10-Ks), quarterly basis disclosures (10-Qs) and any 
other material information regarding changes in the financial condition or operations of the 
companies (8-Ks). Financial reporting is the most common form of mandatory disclosure and 
contains information of the company about the financial position (balance sheet), the result from 
operations (income statement) and other disclosures (statement of cash flows and the statement of 
shareholders).  
One of the key features of corporate financial reporting is that way in which it is prepared. In 
particular, financial reporting is prepared on accrual accounting basis and not on cash accounting 
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basis. Accrual accounting differs from cash accounting because it distinguishes between the 
recording of costs and benefits associated with economic activities and the actual payment and 
receipt of cash. Accrual accounting deals with expectations of future cash consequences of current 
events; therefore, it is subjective and relies on a variety of assumptions made by the management  
The primary objective of traditional financial reporting is the disclosure of financial data within 
the framework of GAAP (Schuster & O'Connell, 2006). In US, Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), subject to oversight by the SEC, promulgates Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP)11. Beyond, giving a common framework and common worldwide “language” 
for financial reporting, FASB attempts to limit managers’ ability to record similar economic 
transactions in different ways by making accounting procedures uniform (Palepu et al., 2003).  
Nevertheless, despite the published information is publicly required it appears to not be enough 
because mandatory disclosure would provide only a formal and official information to the public. 
That could be mainly attributable to the fact that mandatory disclosure does not contain all 
information and factors that affect future facts of the company (reporting gap). On one side, inside 
managers know better about their companies but, on the other side, investors do not because of 
lack of information. Moreover, increased uniformity from accounting standards, however, comes 
at the expense of reduced flexibility for managers to reflect genuine business differences in their 
firm’s financial statements (Palepu, Healy, & Bernard, 2003). 
However, one way for managers to improve the credibility of their financial reporting is 
through voluntary disclosure. Accounting rules usually prescribe minimum disclosure 
requirements, but there are no restrictions for managers from voluntarily providing additional 
information. Voluntary disclosure may reduce the asymmetric information between companies 
(who seek capitals) and investors (who provide capitals), thus reducing the agency problem (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Additional disclosure practices may also enhance the credibility of information 
provided and help to mitigate the “lemons” problem (Akerlof, 1970). Furthermore, voluntary 
disclosure provides the opportunity for companies to signal superior quality and attractiveness 
compared to competitors in the market. For instance, talented managers have an incentive to make 
voluntarily earnings forecasts to reveal their type (Trueman, Why do managers voluntarily release 
earnings forecasts?, 1986).  
                                                 
11 Separately, the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), based in London, has promulgated a set of 
standards knows as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). These standards are quite similar to those in 
United States (US GAAP), though details vary. Nevertheless, since the Norwalk Agreement in 2002, FASB and IASB 
have been working at the creation of high-quality uniform set of accounting standards internationally recognized 
through the convergence of US GAAP and IFRS (IFRS, 2002). 
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2.5.1 VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE: FROM GAAP TOWARDS NON-GAAP REPORTING 
Given the limitations of accounting standards and traditional financial reporting, firms that 
wish to communicate effectively with investors or analysts use alternative ways and one of these 
is by providing voluntary disclosure. Voluntary disclosures can be reported under several ways12. 
In this setting, the focus is on non-GAAP reporting. 
The coming of non-GAAP reporting goes back to 1990s. During the stock bubble of 1997-
2000, financial reporting came into question. Capital markets experienced the entrance of new 
companies, the explosion in size of already existing firms and the rapid rising of stock. Given this 
large enthusiasm in the market, accounting rules and SEC regulation about financial reporting took 
second place, and companies even started to publish false or deceptive financial statements (Lasher, 
2008). In parallel, during the same period, the number of “dot coms” and high-tech firms increased 
significantly as well. In particular, these firms were characterized by high intangibles and income 
losses, at least in the first fiscal years. At that time, it appeared that the GAAP reporting model was 
not particularly suited for high-tech firms. Francis and Schipper (1999) argued GAAP earnings 
tend to be less informative for high-tech firms because these firms invest heavily in intangible 
assets, which may distort GAAP earnings; therefore, these firms would engage alternative ways in 
accounting reporting. Financial reporting model was no longer relevant and claims were that 
traditional earnings “no longer matter” (Penman, 2012). 
Based on that, these years witnessed the rising tide of financial measures derived used 
methods that differed from GAAP13. Technology startups and other companies reporting low 
revenues and high costs did. In particular, these alternative means for accounting were useful to 
explain their businesses to investors without relying exclusively on traditional GAAP metrics 
(Covington, 2016). Consistent with this point of view, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) provide evidence 
that non-GAAP announcements are primarily concentrated in the business service industry, which 
also includes high-tech related industries. Similarly, Lougee and Marquardt (2004) found that 
nearly 40.0% of their firms in their sample operated in the high-tech sector and  that firms with low 
                                                 
12 Voluntary disclosures can be reported in the firm’s annual report, in brochures created to describe the firm to 
investors, in management meetings with analysts, or in investor relations responses to information requests (Palepu et 
al., 2003) 
13 Commonly used non-GAAP financial measures have included (a) earnings before interest and taxes (“EBIT”), (b) 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (“EBITDA”), (c) adjusted EBITDA, (d) adjusted 
revenues; (e) adjusted earnings, (f) adjusted earnings per share, (g) free cash flow, (h) core earnings, and (i) funds from 
operations (“FFO”) (Covington, 2016). 
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GAAP earnings informativeness are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings (pro forma 
earnings) than other firms.   
Other scandals14 and the coming of these alternative non-GAAP performance measures 
(noticed especially in the high-tech sector) led to concerns from regulators and standards until the 
exacerbation and reshaping of the regulation. In particular, the close link between them was the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), enacted from the US Congress in 2002. Among the several sections 
illustrated in the SOX, in which the SEC, on behave of the Congress, had to make new regulations, 
two sections in particular addressed the issues that financial markets were facing in the facts 
illustrated earlier. On one side, the SOX, applied to all US listed companies, requires the full 
disclosure of “all material off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations (…) that may 
have a material current or future effect on financial condition (...)” (see section 401 (j) of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act). On the other side, the SOX requires that “pro forma financial information, 
included in any periodic or other report (…) or in any public disclosure (…), shall be presented in 
a manner that does not contain an untrue statement of a material fact (…); and reconciles it with 
the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer under GAAP” (see section 401 (b) of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
Recently, non-GAAP reporting has become a common form of voluntary disclosure. In 
US, listed companies are required to follow GAAP for the creation of financial reports, but they 
have the freedom to release additional reports prepared using non-GAAP principles. Better stated, 
companies may add to their GAAP reporting within their disclosure mandatory filings. However, 
before non-GAAP reporting reaches the actual stage, the regulation of non-GAAP reporting moved 
through several interventions over time. In particular: 
 On 4 December 2001, the SEC issued a “cautionary advice”. Through that document, the 
SEC published a statement regarding the use by listed companies of non-GAAP or “pro-
forma” financial information in earnings releases. In particular, the SEC warned public 
companies who present to public investors their earnings and results of operation using 
methodologies other than GAAP. The SEC was expressly concerned that non-GAAP 
financial information carries “no defined meaning and no uniform characteristics”, may 
“mislead investors if it obscures GAAP results”.  
                                                 




 On 30 July 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was signed into law. In particular, the 
section 401 (b) of the SOX addressed the SEC to establish rules regulating disclosures of 
non-GAAP financial measures.  
 On 22 January 2003, the SEC proposed finalized rules about what was established in section 
401 (b) of the SOX. The new rules include Regulation G, amendment to item 10 of the 
Regulation S-K and item 2.02 to Form 8-K.  
 On 11 January 2010, the SEC issued a Compliance and Disclosure Interpretation to renew 
its emphasis of non-GAAP financial measures [last update on 17 May 2016]. 
 
For over 20 years, regulators and standards have expressed concerns and interest about non-
GAAP reporting. The SEC were skeptical at the beginning regarding the use of these measures and 
promptly the “cautionary advice” was issued. However, the re-shaping in the accounting regulation 
have brought to proper rules that govern non-GAAP financial reporting (Regulation G, amendment 
to item 10 of Regulation S-K). Studies on non-GAAP reporting refer usually to non-GAAP 
earnings. 
In the practice, non-GAAP are GAAP earnings adjusted for items viewed as “unusual” or 
“non-recurring” or non-representative of ongoing operations. The extent literature names non-
GAAP earnings as “pro-forma” earnings and as “street earnings”. The former refer to customized 
earnings disclosed by managers, the latter refer to earnings produced by Wall Street financial 
analysts. However, they both refer to numbers not calculated in accordance to GAAP and they are 
used interchangeably in this study.  
Managers, together with analysts, are users of non-GAAP earnings. Both managers and 
analysts may reach differ numbers when calculating nonstandard earnings, because they separately 
have different perceptions of which items are worth to be included or excluded from the GAAP 
earnings (McGinty, 2015). Therefore, non-GAAP earnings reported by companies may not match 
up with Street earnings calculated by analysts. However, the “one-size-fits-all” nature of GAAP 
earnings pushes managers and analysts to assess the performance through an adjusted measure 
(Whipple , 2015). These adjustments are: 
 Non-recurring item exclusions (special items or one-time items); 
 Recurring item exclusions (costs associated with redundancies, restructuring, mergers, 




With regard to managers, items excluded in arriving to their non-GAAP earnings, where most of 
them are expenses, refer to: 
 stock based compensation, 
 payroll tax expense related to stock based compensation,  
 compensation expense related to contingent retention bonuses,  
 acquisition related expense,  
 depreciation and amortization, 
 foreign exchange effect on revenue,  
 purchases of property and equipment/property and equipment purchased under capital 
lease, unrealized gain/loss on fuel price derivatives, 
 deferred loan costs associated with extinguishment of debt,  
 gains on divestiture,  
 preopening expenses,  
 management recruiting expenses,  
 management and consulting fees,  
 general and administrative expenses, 
 litigation expenses, 
 integration costs, 
 restructuring costs, 
 gross profit deferred due to lease accounting (New Constructs, 2015). 
 
With regard to analysts, two situations occur. On one side, analysts treat differently the items 
excluded by managers from non-GAAP earnings. On the other side, analysts are themselves 
attracted from non-GAAP earnings issued by companies.  
When using prediction models to forecast EPS for the fiscal year, analysts adjust non-GAAP 
earnings to account for non-recurring items. For instance, Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) provide 
evidence that also analysts, together with managers, increasingly focus on Street earnings by 
excluding a variety of “special” or “non-cash” items. Similarly, Gu and Chen (2004) find that 
analysts do not fully reverse all recurring expenses excluded by managers, highlighting the 




In the light of the above, the extant literature on non-GAAP earnings concentrates on whether these 
alternative measures provide, on one side, new information to market participants and, on the other 
side, whether managers to hide relevant information to mislead investors use these measures. With 
this in mind, the two main assumptions that justify the disclosure of non-GAAP measures are 
informativeness and opportunistic behavior. 
With regard to informativeness, supporters on non-GAAP reporting highlight the need to 
remove the size of non-recurring items from GAAP earnings in order to better clarify complex 
accounting disclosures. Managers do believe that by excluding transitory and non-cash items, non-
GAAP earnings improve the assessment for future cash flows and firm value. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2003), using a sample of 1,149 actual pro forma earnings in press releases from 
1998 to 2000, collect all earnings announcements in which the company disclose diluted non-
GAAP earnings that differ from diluted GAAP earnings. They examine the relative 
informativeness and persistence of pro forma earnings vis-à-vis GAAP operating earnings. Their 
results suggest that market participants perceive pro forma earnings to be closer to “core earnings” 
than GAAP operating earnings. Similarly, using a sample of 249 press releases from 1997-99, 
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that firms with low GAAP earnings informativeness are more 
likely to disclose pro forma earnings than other firms. Both studies use similar proxies to assess 
the informativeness of non-GAAP earnings. In particular, this proxy refers to market-adjusted 
returns regressed on earnings surprise15. 
With regard to opportunistic behavior, critics argue that such adjustments make earnings 
not comparable across industries, because of the diversity among discretionary adjustments made 
by managers. Firstly, someone raised doubt about the comparability and consistency in the 
financial information, highlighting the difficulty to benchmark a firm’s non-GAAP measure over 
time. In particular, managers do not use the same adjustments on earnings year by year, implying 
a sort of discontinuity. Secondly, managers’ behavior may intentionally misreport the actual 
performance by making ad-hoc and self-serving adjustments. In particular, managers’ 
opportunistic and incentive behavior push them to exclude certain items from GAAP earnings in 
arriving at the actual non- GAAP measure, depicting the company in the best way possible. 
Doyle, Lundholm & Soliman (2003) investigate the informational properties of non-GAAP 
earnings for future cash flow from operations. In particular, using a sample of 143,462 firm quarter 
                                                 




observations from 1988 to 1999, the items excluded from GAAP earnings to calculate non-GAAP 
earnings are divided in special items and other items. As managers claim, special items are in 
general non-recurring and non-related to future cash flows, whereas other items are. However, 
evidence shows exclusions are negatively associated with future cash flow, indicating their 
recurring and consuming cash nature, consistent partly with the opportunistic behavior point of 
view.  
Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto (2005) argue that managers emphasize the metric that portrays better 
firm performance. Using sample of 1,518 earnings releases, they consider two measures of 
emphasis: the level of emphasis (identifying whether non-GAAP and GAAP earnings are 
mentioned in the press release16) and the relative emphasis (difference in placement between non-
GAAP and GAAP earnings). They provide evidence that firms reporting non-GAAP profits but 
GAAP losses place more emphasis on non-GAAP earnings.  
Similarly, Wang (2014) documents that managers use presentation arrangements of earnings 
release opportunistically, by intentionally choosing presentation arrangements allowing the 
favorable highlighting of firm performance. Assuming managers acting opportunistically, Doyle, 
Jennings and Soliman (2013) argue the possibility that managers use their discretion to reclassify 
some actual recurring expenses from their non-GAAP earnings in order to meet or beat analyst 
benchmarks. In particular, they find evidence that firms are more likely to meet or beat analyst 
forecasts when using non-GAAP earnings, which usually are higher than normal GAAP earnings17.  
 
 2.5.2 EFFECTS OF REGULATION G AND AMENDMENTS IN NON-GAAP REPORTING 
As directed by a specific provision in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC adopted 
new rules and amendments to address listed companies’ disclosure of financial information that is 
calculated with methodologies different from GAAP. In particular, the SEC adopted a new 
disclosure regulation, Regulation G, which governs the conditions for use of non-GAAP financial 
measures by US listed companies 
Regulation G defines a non-GAAP financial measure, as “a numerical measure of a 
registrant’s historical or future financial performance, financial position or cash flows that: 
                                                 
16 From the highest to the lowest level emphasis: 1) headline, 2) first/second paragraph, 3) third paragraph or later  and 
4) only in the financial statement at the end of the press release (Bowen et al., 2005). 
17 Evidence show the odds of a firm meeting or beating the consensus analyst forecast are 1.14 times greater for 
firms using non-GAAP earnings that are higher than GAAP earnings (Doyle et al., 2013). 
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 excludes amounts, or is subject to adjustments that have the effect of excluding amounts, 
that are included in the most directly comparable measure calculated and presented in 
accordance with GAAP18 in the statement of income, balance sheet or statement of cash 
flows (or equivalent statements) of the issuer; or 
 includes amounts, or is subject to adjustments that have the effect of including amounts, 
that are excluded from the most directly comparable measure so calculated and presented” 
(SEC, 2003). 
 
Regulation G requires the registrant to provide a presentation of the most directly 
comparable financial measure calculated in accordance with GAAP; and a reconciliation of the 
differences between the non-GAAP financial measure presented and the most directly comparable 
financial measure calculated in accordance with GAAP” (SEC, 2003). However, the definition of 
a non-GAAP financial measure excludes:  
 operating and other statistical measures (such as unit sales, numbers of employees, numbers 
of subscribers or numbers of advertisers); and  
 ratios or statistical measures calculated using exclusively GAAP financial measures (such 
as operating margin) or operating measures or other measures that do not constitute non-
GAAP financial measures (such as sales per square foot and same store sales); or  
 financial measures required to be disclosed by GAAP (such as segment profit or loss and 
segment total assets and pro forma financial information required by Regulation S-X), SEC 
rules or a system of regulation of a government or governmental authority or self-regulatory 
organization that is applicable to a registrant (such as measures of capital or reserves 
calculated for regulatory purposes) (Skadden, , 2016). 
 
Summing up, Regulation G prohibits the use of non-GAAP measures outside of SEC filing 
without complementary disclosure of the most directly comparable GAAP measure and a 
reconciliation of the two financial measures. Together with Regulation G, amendment to item 10 
of Regulation S-K requires additional disclosure and impose restrictions regarding the use of non-
GAAP measures in SEC filings. In particular, item 10 of Regulation S-K states that whenever one 
or more non-GAAP financial measures are included in a filing with the Commission, the registrant 
must present, ‘‘with equal or greater prominence’’, the most directly comparable GAAP financial 
                                                 
18 GAAP refers to generally accepted accounting principles in the United States (US GAAP). 
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measure. Finally, Item 2.02 of Form 8-K, which requires public companies to provide to the SEC 
earnings releases or announcements that disclose material non-public financial information about 
completed annual or quarterly fiscal periods.  
Based on these events in the regulation, the extant literature provide evidence of what these 
regulations have brought as consequences along several dimensions. In particular, after the 
Regulation G, evidences show changes in the frequency of non-GAAP earnings, emphasis of non-
GAAP earnings and quality of exclusions in non-GAAP earnings.  
 
Frequency of non-GAAP 
Evidence initially shows a decline in the frequency of non-GAAP reporting immediately after the 
regulation. For instance, using a sample of 2,138 US firms and 42,760 firm-quarter observations19 
from 2000 to 2004, Heflin and Hsu (2008) count the number of times each firm discloses non-
GAAP earnings within 12 pre-regulation quarters and 8 post-regulation quarters. In particular, they 
classify firms as non-GAAP, GAAP, or mixed disclosers in the pre- and (separately) in the post-
regulation periods based on how many times they disclose non-GAAP earnings in each period (pre 
and post Regulation G)20. In the 2,138 sample firms, on one hand, 522 firms (30%) out of 1,727 
(either non-GAAP or mixed disclosers in pre-Regulation G) shifted toward more GAAP disclosure 
in the post-Regulation G. On the other hand, 425 firms (25.3%) out of 1683 (either GAAP or mixed 
disclosers in pre-Regulation G) shifted toward less GAAP disclosure in the post-Regulation G. 
Thus, a higher percentage of firms shifted toward more (by 5%) rather than less GAAP disclosures.   
 
Emphasis on non-GAAP  
In a sample of quarterly earnings press releases of 361 S&P500 firms issued between 2001 and 
200321, Marques (2010) hand-collects non-GAAP financial measures present in the press releases 
                                                 
19 The sample consists of all firms with quarterly actual and forecasted EPS data (from IBES), which are proxy of non-
GAAP earnings, and GAAP earnings data (from Compustat). The time horizon is from the first quarter of 2000 to the 
fourth quarter of 2004. In this way, the sample contains observations pre and post-regulation G (Heflin & Hsu, 2008). 
20 Criteria for labeling firms as non-GAAP, GAAP or mixed disclosers are based on how many times firms disclose 
non-GAAP earnings before and after the Regulation G. In particular: 
 Non-GAAP discloser: more than or equal to 10 times (pre-regulation G) and more than or equal to 6 times 
(post-regulation G); 
 GAAP discloser: less than or equal to 1 time (pre-regulation G) and less than or equal to 1 time (post-
regulation G);  
 Mixed disclosers: all other cases different from the two above (Heflin & Hsu, 2008). 
21 The author uses this time-frame because it covers two separate interventions by the SEC on the disclosure of non-
GAAP financial measures (already mentioned in the paragraph 2.2). The first intervention in December 2001 refers to 
the “cautionary advice” and the second intervention in January 2003 refers to Regulation G ( (Marques, 2010). 
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and examines their prominence (emphasis) over three years. With the item 10 (e) of regulation S-
K in mind22, on one side, results show that among firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings measures 
the mean of the prominence of the comparable GAAP number has statistically significant incresaed 
from 3.46 (in 2001) to 4.21 (in 2003). On the other side, there is a decrease in the emphasis given 
to non-GAAP measures over the same period. Although the decrease in the promince of non-GAAP 
measures from 2001 to 2002 is not statisticallt significant, the difference is statistically significant 
from 2002 to 2003, with means respectively 4.34 and 3.96. Therefore, there changes may be 
attributale to the introduction of Regulation G and modifications in Regulation S-K (Marques, 
2010).  
 
Quality of exclusions from GAAP earnings SEC 
Using a sample of 104,954 earnings quarterly observations23 drawn from the second quarter of 
1998 through the third quarter of 2004, Kolev et al. (2008) assess if the SEC intervention in non-
GAAP reporting affects the quality of exclusion componentes. Exclusions are divided in special 
items and other exclusions. In particular, the former are generally unrelated to future cash flows 
(i.e. restructuring charge) , but the latter (i.e. amortization of goodwill) are more powerful in 
predicting future cash flows24. Therefore, in predicting future operating income, they find a 
significant coefficient that provides evidence  other exclusions are more transitory following the 




2.6 DISCLOSURE PRACTICE IN THE US IPOS SETTING 
There are significant regulations governing corporate disclosure in the US and especially 
in particular settings. Consider those companies that decide to go public in the US market. 
Companies embarking on the IPO process have to comply with many accounting and disclosure 
                                                 
22  
23 They use IBES actual earnings to proxy the non-GAAP earnings disclosed by managers in the press releases (Kolev 
et al., 2008).  
24 As Doyle et al. (2003) investigate the informational properties of non-GAAP earnings for future cash flows (see 
sub- paragraph 2.2.2), similarly, Kolev et al. (2008) similarly assess the informativeness of exclusions made in non-
GAAP earnings calcualation. 




requirements that do not apply to private companies. US GAAP dictate many of them and other 
disclosure requirements are required by the SEC rules and regulations (EY, 2015). The need for a 
severe compliance with the filings required by the SEC for registrants relies on the fact that the 
market for initial public offerings (IPOs) is very volatile and risky. In particular, the SEC applies 
two regulations governing IPOs:  
 the Security Act of 1933 (Security Act), which governs the initial offer and the sale of the 
securities; and 
 the Security Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), which regulates the post-issuance 
trading of securities, the activities of listed companies and the activities of other market 
participants, such as underwriters (Latham & Watkins, 2016).  
 
To register an offering, a company files a registration statement with the SEC, typically 
using Form S-1. The prospectus is included in the Form S-1 and is used by the company to solicit 
investors. The prospectus describes the company, the IPO terms and other information that 
investors may use when deciding whether to invest or not. Since a new public company typically 
lack of prior reporting history, the information that can inform investors can only be found in the 
prospectus (SEC, 2013). The purpose of the prospectus is disclosure, hence it must truly and 
accurately inform potential investors of the nature of the business, and the risks involved. The 
prospectus must be conformed to the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. 1 In particular, 
the Securities Act of 1933 requires that investors receive financial and other significant information 
concerning securities being offered for public sale; and prohibits deceit, misrepresentations, and 
other fraud in the sale of securities. In order to achieve these objectives, the disclosure of important 
financial information becomes relevant through the registration of securities. 
The registration statement (Form S-1) consists of two parts. The first part includes essential 
facts and are required by law to be included in the prospectus. The second part includes additional, 
but not required, information (PwC, 2011). The information required in the prospectus (Part I) 
refers to prospectus summary, risk factors associated with the business, use of proceeds, dividend 
policy, capitalization, dividend policy, capitalization, dilution, underwriting and distribution of 
securities, information about the company’s business, financial information26, pro forma, 
information about the company’s officers, directors, and principal shareholders, executive 
                                                 
26 In a Form S-1 registration statement, a company must generally present annual audited financial statements, interim 
unaudited financial statements (PwC, 2011). 
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compensation and MD&A. The information not required in the prospectus (Part II) regards, for 
instance, expenses associated with the issuance and distribution of securities, the indemnification 
of directors and various financial statement schedules (PwC, 2011). 
When the registration statement has been completed, the document is filed with the SEC 
by electronic transmission through EDGAR27. Once the registration statement is filed with the 
SEC, then the SEC’s Corporate Finance Division has 30 days to perform the initial review and 
provide comments on the registration statement. In particular, the Division determines whether 
there is full and fair disclosure, and determines whether the documents contain material 
misstatements or omissions of relevant facts. However, from the first draft to the final version, 
an S-1 prospectus of a company goes through many revisions. In particular, after reviewing the 
registration statement, the Division staff usually issues a “comment letter” that sets forth questions, 
possible deficiencies, suggested revisions and inclusion of additional information. Companies, in 
turn, reply indicating their responses to the comments and the registrant’s offering can become 
effective as soon as the Division approves all responses to its comment (PwC, 2011). 
Nevertheless, while the SEC is examining the prospectus, a “preliminary” prospectus may 
circulate but it does not yet represent an actual offering. Such type of prospectus is known as “red 
herring”, because the word “preliminary” is stamped in red letters. The red herring may be sent to 
institutions or persons prior to the effective date of the registration statement. However, while in 
the past companies have occasionally distributed the red herring, companies are now encouraged 
not to print the red herring until SEC comments have been received facts. In fact, the practice shows 
that as soon as all SEC comments have been cleared, the company typically prints the red herring 
and the selling phase begins (PwC, 2011).  
 
2.6.1 RESTRICTION OF DISCLOSURE DURING THE IPO PROCESS AND GUN JUMPING 
The SEC imposes restrictions on public disclosures, or communication, during the public 
offering process. In particular, these restrictions aim to prevent issuers and underwriters from 
attempting to offer or sell securities in the absence of available information. Concerns underlying 
these restrictions explain that certain communications may cause public interest in a particular 
stock without providing investors adequate disclosure. The SEC is particularly concerned and 
                                                 
27 EDGAR, the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system, performs automated collection, validation, 
indexing, acceptance, and forwarding of submissions by companies and others who are required by law to file forms 
with the US SEC.   
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possible violations may result in the SEC imposing a “cooling-off” period, in which the IPO 
process could be delayed and possible sanctions for the company by the SEC may occur (Skadden, 
Securities offering and gun jumping: what you can do and cannot do, 2012). 
Figure 3 illustrates the three stages of the registration process, starting from the pre-filing 
period, going across the waiting period, towards the post-effective period. The two statuses of the 
registration statements are illustrated as well, respectively the filing date and the effectiveness date.  
 
 
Depending on the manner and content, communications made by the company during any 
of these three stages may result in violations of Section 5 of the Securities Act (Prohibitions relating 
to interstate commerce and the mails). In particular, communication related violations in the IPO 
stages are called “gun jumping” and it applies to all forms of communication channels, such as 
press releases, interviews and even social media.  
Firstly, the quiet or pre-filing period is that time length between the decision to proceed 
with a public offering and the actual filing of a registration statement with the SEC. During this 
period, a potential registrant is subject to restrictions on public disclosure relating to the offering. 
The pre-filing period begins when the company and its underwriter reach a preliminary 
understanding to proceed with a public offering. During this period, top management generally will 
Source: (Skadden, 2012) 
 
Source: (Skadden, Securities offering and gun jumping: what you can do and cannot do, 2012) 
 
Source: (Skadden, 2012) 
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Figure 5 - Stages of the offering process 
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make a series of presentations covering the company’s business and industry, market opportunities 
and financial questions to the investment community.  The underwriter will use these presentations 
as an opportunity to ask questions and establish their due diligence. However, statements made 
within 30 days of filing a registration statement that could be considered an attempt to pre-sell the 
public offering may be considered an illegal prospectus, if no exception or safe harbor applies. This 
might result in the SEC’s delaying of the public offering (Anthony, 2014).  
Secondly, the waiting or pre-effective period is that time length between the filing date 
and the effective date of the registration statement.  During this period, the company may generally 
make oral offers, but binding agreements to sell the offered security are not permitted. During this 
period, among other things, the company begins marketing the offering, through real-time oral 
offers, including calls to potential investors. However, the SEC do not permit inappropriate 
marketing, conditioning or “hyping” the security before all investors have access to publicly 
available information. While binding commitments are not permitted, the underwriter can receive 
indications of interest from potential investors, indicating the price they would be willing to pay 
and the number of shares they would purchase (book-building process). Once the SEC’s comments 
are resolved, or it is clear that there are no material open issues, the company may do 14-21 day 
“road show” 28during which management meet with potential investors. (Anthony, 2014). 
As it possible to notice, regulations for the restriction of communication during the first two stages 
of the IPO are well severe and strict. However, the SEC provides a number of “safe harbors” 
applicable to both pre-filing communication and pre-effective communication periods which 
specify the types of communications and information that are allowed without being considered 
“gun jumping.”  
Broadly speaking, during the pre-filing period, an issuer can: 
 take advantage safe harbor for communications that do not refer to the IPO made more than 
30 days prior to the filing of the registration statement (Rule 163A);  
 release a limited notice regarding the planned IPO (Securities Act Rule 135); and  
 release certain factual information (Rule 169) (Anthony, 2014). 
 
In addition, during the waiting period, an issuer can: 
                                                 
28 For potential investors to learn about the company, an underwriter will arrange meetings, called “road shows,” 
with financial analysts, brokers, and potential institutional investors (PwC, 2001). 
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 publish a limited notice of its upcoming IPO (pursuant to the Securities Act Rule 134 safe 
harbor); 
 circulate a preliminary prospectus (often referred to as a “red herring”) that meets the 
requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act, including a price range for the offering;  
 conduct a road show and solicit “buy” orders; and 
 under certain circumstances, use a free writing prospectus, or FWP29 (Anthony, 2014). 
 
Thirdly, the post-effective period confirms the effectiveness of the registration statement 
(the Division has approved all responses to its comment letters) and goes up to 25 days after the 
effectiveness of the registration statement. Underwriters and those in charge for distribution of 
shares confirm sales of the securities by using the final prospectus, in which the final offer price is 
included. At closing date, the company delivers the registered securities to the underwriter and, in 
turn, receives payment for the issue (PwC, 2011).  
To conclude, the fact that the public offering process takes a long time (about 6-12 months) 
and that every phase is well articulated it is because the market of IPO is very volatile. Given this 
particularity of this market, at the same time, it is not easy to assess the value of an IPO, and the 
presence of misleading information may worsen the entire operation. With this in mind, every 
phase of the process has the objective to bring the whole operation towards the success and severe 
restrictions imposed by regulations aim at avoiding material facts and information that may affect 
negatively investors. 
  
2.6.2 ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL INFORMATION: NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES  
One aspect of S-1 disclosures that recently has attracted a lot of attention is the use of non-
GAAP metrics to describe a company’s financial performance (Usvyatsky, 2015). Although not 
expressly required, in addition to the formal requirements of Regulations S-K and S-X, it has 
become usual to include additional operational and other metrics in the prospectus. This could be 
useful to help investors to understand better the issuer’s business. This information is usually 
included in the prospectus at the end of Selected Financial Data section under a caption labeled 
“Other Financial Data” (Latham & Watkins, 2016).  
                                                 
29 See Rule 405 under the Securities Act 
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Companies commonly report non-GAAP earnings as supplement to their reported GAAP 
earnings because they believe the non-standard measures reflect more accurately their results of 
operations or financial position (Skadden, 2016). Companies believe that investors use them to 
valuate the performance because they contain better information (Bhattacharyaa et al., 2003). A 
recent survey conducted over 400 IPOs, completed between 2011 and 2013, describes the use of 
non-GAAP earnings in the prospectus filed with the SEC. Figure 6 displays the most common non-




Among the seven most frequently non-GAAP measures appearing in the prospectus, 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) appears to be the most 
common non-GAAP measure, together with its adjusted version, Adjusted EBITDA (46%). More 
surprisingly, 95% of IPO firms that disclose non-GAAP measures in the prospectus (60%), 
includes three or less non-GAAP numbers (PwC, 2014). 
Managers decide to disclose non-GAAP earnings because their effective use can “help companies 
to shape the way they are viewed by the investment community” by giving insight of how 
Source: PwC, 2014 
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management views its core business performance (PwC, 2014). For instance, during the book-
building process, potential investors, financial analysts and anyone interested in the business may 
expect to get more information if such nonstandard earnings are provided (PwC, 2014). 
Nevertheless, when calculating non-GAAP earnings, the broad diversity in adjustments made by 
managers could complicate comparisons from one company to another one. For instance, the 
adjusted EBITDA may have different types of exclusions depending on the single company (PwC, 
2014). 
Another interesting aspect connected with the recent massively use of non-GAAP earnings 
in the prospectus is the high number of comment letters the SEC Division issued after reviewing 
the registration statement (Usvyatsky, 2015). Figure 7 summarizes data about IPO companies that 
















In particular, the percentage of IPO companies receiving non-GAAP earnings related 
comment letters is 63% in 2010, but it remains at 41% in 2014. Considerable is also the number of 
IPO companies that issued non-GAAP earnings in the prospectus over time with 56 companies in 
2010 compared to 127 in 2014. Surprisingly 40 companies went public in 2014 reported losses 
under GAAP rules but showed profits under their customized measures (Rapoport, 2015). 
Source: (Usvyatsky, 2015) 
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With this in mind, the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings metrics in the IPO prospectus has become 
increasingly common in recent years and a considerable debate exists. On one hand, managers 
claim that nonstandard measures present a more transparent view of the company. On the other 
hand, critics argue that adjusted earnings portray an inflated view of future performance and IPO 
value, with regulators and standard setters expressing concern about the complexity, lack of 
comparability of these measures across firms, their undue prominence in prospectuses, and their 
potential to mislead investors (Usvyatsky 2015). 
However, there is little academic evidence of non-GAAP disclosure practices in the IPO 
setting, and the only available evidence shows that on a sample of 696 book-built IPOs completed 
between 2003 and 2012, 252 of IPO firms (36%) disclose an adjusted measure, alias non-GAAP 
measures, in the final prospectus. In particular, this disclosure practices rises over time, where 61% 
of the prospectuses reports non-GAAP earnings compared to 22% in 2003. Moreover, similarly to 
previous studies30, non-GAAP earnings present in IPO filing are usually higher than GAAP 
earnings (Brown et al., 2016). The authors find that the disclosure and emphasis of non-GAAP 
earnings in IPO filing are related to GAAP operating performance. In particular, IPO firms are less 
likely to report and emphasize non-GAAP earnings when GAAP earnings are extremely good or 
poor31. Finally, non-GAAP IPOs are more underpriced and have higher post-issue return volatility, 
and that this relation increases with the magnitude of firms’ recurring item adjustments, suggesting 
that during an IPO non-GAAP information is associated with pronounced information uncertainty 
(Brown et al., 2016). 
 
 
2.7 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The accounting and financial literature on analyst coverage and corporate disclosure shows 
the importance relationship between the two. The role of corporate disclosure is crucial in the IPO 
process since information asymmetries are more severe for IPO firms than already established 
public companies. Indeed, IPOs may not have a detailed past record of their performance and 
                                                 
30See Doyle et al., 2003 and Bowen et al., 2005 
31 There exists an inverted U-shaped relation between GAAP earnings performance and non-GAAP reporting (Brown 
et al., 2016). 
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operations because they are younger and partially developed. At the same time, the role of financial 
analysts as information intermediaries is fundamental in order to collect and analyze information.  
With regard to financial analysts, the IPO market could generate great opportunities for 
them. The literature suggests that more underpriced IPOs tend to attract more analysts (Rajan & 
Servaes , 1997), especially if analysts exploit underpriced securities to generate more trading with 
benefits in term of trading commissions. What financial analysts do is forecasting earnings for the 
fiscal years. Annual earnings forecasts are used then by analysts’ clients (brokers, investment 
banks, investors) when they want information about the stock to decide whether to invest or not. 
With regard to corporate disclosure practices in IPO market, non-GAAP earnings reported 
by IPO registrants in their prospectus is an interesting field to investigate. Lang and Lundholm 
(1996) argue that more forthcoming corporate disclosure practices attract more analysts. However, 
part of the non-GAAP earnings literature reputes non-GAAP earnings informative because they 
reflect the core earnings of the company (informativeness view). Others argue that exclusion made 
in calculating non-GAAP earnigs are misappropriate (opportunistic view). In this setting the 
informative view can help if non-GAAP earnings are relevant for analysts and in the timing of their 
forecasts. Different from Lang and Lundholm (1996), it is not investigated the number of analysts 
following the company, but rather the length of time between the offer date and the date in which 
the earnings analyst forecast is made (activation date). Whit this in mind, the following hyphothesis 
is furmulated: 
 
H1: The presence of non-GAAP earnings in the prospectus reduce the forecast window between 






































        3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
 
3.1 DATA AND SAMPLE PROFILE 
The sample comprises US IPO deals between January 2003 and December 2012.  IPO firms 
are listed in NASDAQ, NYSE or AMEX. IPO deals are completed and the firms have filed the 
final prospectus (Form S-1) with the SEC. Before the final construction of the sample, three 
different procedures data information collections are needed. 
 
IPOs information. Data on IPOs deals completed between 2003 and 2012 are retrievied from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon using the app Deal Screener. This dataset contains information on IPOs 
deals completed between 2003 and 2012, including name of the company, issuer ticker symbol, 
issuer primary SIC, filing date, issue date, listing date, end of the quiet period, book-runner, 
numbers of managers, gross proceeds, offer price, closing price one day after offer. 
Following prior research, IPOs classified as American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), real estate 
investment trusts (REITs), closed-end funds and reverse leveraged buy-out (LBOs) are eliminated. 
Offerings whose the offer price is less than $5 are also excluded. 
  
Non-GAAP IPOs information. Data on whether IPO firms disclose non-GAAP earnings in the 
final prospectus are collected from an external dataset of a previous study32. On that basis, the 
sample period begins in 2003 to coincide with the SEC’s approval of Regulation G and 
amendments to Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K (January 2003), which govern the usage of non-
GAAP financial measures in public disclosures and documents filed with the SEC, including the 
prospectus.  
 
Earnings forecasts information. Data on analyst earnings forecasts for the fiscal years are 
collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon connected with IBES. In particular, each IPO deal is 
tracked to see if annual analyst earnings forecasts exist up to two fiscal year from the offering date. 
                                                 
32 I thank N. Brown, T. Christensen, A.Menini and T.Steffen for providing me data with regard the sample of IPO 
firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings between 2003 and 2012. 
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Issuer ticker symbols are used to retrieve data of analyst earnings forecasts. In particular, ticker 
symbols are bundled based on the year in which the offering occurs.  This dataset includes 
forecasted earnings per share (EPS) calculated by sell-side analysts for three fiscal years following 
the offering. It also contains information about the analyst name, brokerage houses name, the date 
of the forecast and the period year for which the forecast refers. 
 
Finally, in order to create a unique dataset, the IPO dataset and non-GAAP dataset are 
merged to include in the former the variable that indicates the presence of non-GAAP earnings in 
the prospectus (NONGAAP). The variable (NONGAAP) takes value one for IPOs firm that report 
non-GAAP earnings number in the prospectus and zero otherwise. Afterwards, earnings forecasts 
dataset and IPO dataset are merged as well, where data on EPS forecasts calculated by analysts and 
information about IPO firms are included. The final sample comprises 21,004 analyst EPS forecasts 
calculated for 691 US IPO deals completed between 2003 and 2012, of which 239 firms disclose 
non-GAAP earnings in the prospectus. 
 
 
3.2 DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
3.2.1 US IPO MARKET 
With regard to characteristics of IPO firms in the sample, Figure 1 illustrates the frequency 
of IPO volume and the proportion of IPO firms that report non-GAAP earnings in the final 
prospectus filed with the SEC over the 2003-2012 period. As it possible to notice, there is an 
increase in the IPO volume between 2003 and 2007 (post-bubble period), but the market of IPOs 
undergoes a sharp decline in 2008-2009, because of the financial crisis. In the post-crisis period, a 
steady post-crisis recovery follows between 2010 and 2012. In particular, non-GAAP earnings 
reporting increased over the sample period, as more than 60.0% of IPOs report non-GAAP earnings 
measures in 2012 compared to 19.50% in 2003. This increase is more evident after the financial 
crisis (2008) and when the SEC issues a Compliance and Disclosure Interpretation of non-GAAP 
financial measures (2010). It is notable a sharp uptick in 2009, followed by a decrease over 2010 




Finally, figure 2 illustrates the stock exchange in which the IPO companies are listed, where the 
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Table 1 provides summary statistics on the full IPOs sample with regard to intrinsic 
characteristics of the offering over the sample period from 2003 to 2012.  
 
Table 1 – Summary statistics regarding IPOs characteristics 
GAAP IPOs 
  N Mean SD p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
Underpricing 440 0.14 0.2 -0.11 0 0.09 0.24 0.51 
Gross proceeds 452 125.65 748.47 4 27.6 62.5 95.85 315 
Shares offered 452 9.58 30.03 1.75 4.55 6 8.15 22.17 
Size 422 291.11 1050.93 7.9 49.1 98.15 221 838.1 
Managers 452 5.28 3.39 2 4 4 6 12 
                  
Non-GAAP IPOs 
  N Mean SD p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
Underpricing 232 0.13 0.21 -0.09 0 0.09 0.2 0.49 
Gross proceeds 239 185.75 364.37 5.4 33.75 92 189 567 
Shares offered 239 12.95 15.28 1 5 8.6 15 35 
Size 222 835.9 1859.97 24.1 98.3 244.3 664.9 3429.5 
Managers 239 6.92 3.96 2 5 6 8 15 
 
In particular, the variables summarized are:  
 Underpricing, that is equal to the percentage change between the offer price and the first-
trading day closing price and refers to the first-day return of the IPO. 
 Gross proceeds, which are equal to the total funds raised by the company. 
 Shares offered, which are equal to the number of shares offered to the public that are not 
owned by insiders. 
 Size, that it is equal to total balance sheet assets, including current assets, long-term 
investment and funds, net fixed assets, intangible assets and deferred charges, after the 
offering. Equals total liabilities plus shareholders' equity plus minority interest. 
 Managers, which are equal to the total number of IPO managers, including lead and co-
underwriters.  
Source: Personal elaboration 
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As it possible to notice, non-GAAP IPOs are, on overage, less underpriced than GAAP IPOs, about 
13% and 14 % respectively. Moreover, non-GAAP IPOs raised, on average, 187.75 millions of 
dollars against 125.65 millions of dollars. At the same time, non-GAAP IPOs offered, on average, 
more shares to public than GAAP IPOs, 12.95 and 9.58 million respectively. It is also evident that 
non-GAAP IPO are, on average, larger than GAAP IPOs in term of size. Indeed, sizes measure 
835.90 and 291.11 respectively for non-GAAP and GAAP IPOs. Finally, non-GAAP IPOs, on 
average, have higher number of IPO managers (underwriters) involved in the IPO process.  
 
3.2.1 ANALYST FORECASTS IN US IPO MARKET 
With regard to the characteristics of earnings forecasts calculated by analysts, table 2 
reports the number of first unique analyst activations regarding IPO firms during the sample period 
from 2003 to 2012. In order to illustrate them, it is necessary the definition of the variable days to 
coverage that it is equal to the difference in trading days between the date of the forecast calculated 
by the analyst and the date of the offering. Not all days to coverage referred to the analyst are 
considered, but only the lowest days to coverage. This means that if the analyst has calculated 
forecasts for the same company in different dates, only the earliest date is considered for the 
calculation of days to coverage. This date refers to the activation date for the analyst. Additionally, 
analysts may have calculated several EPS forecasts for consecutive fiscal years (FYO, FY1 and 
FY2) at the activation date, but in this setting only the timing (days to coverage) of the earliest 
forecast for each active analyst is considered. This procedure requires a collapse of the sample by 
the variable days to coverage, where the new sample structure presents, alongside other variables, 
only the lowest days to coverage registered for the analyst for a given public offering.  
Table 2, together with the number of first unique activations of analysts, includes also 
6486 number of total first activations registered within the first two years after the offering (about 
523 trading days) over the sample period 2003 - 2012. In particular, 4073 is the number of first 
activations for offering presenting only GAAP earnings in the prospectus (only GAAP IPOs) and 
2413 is the number of first activations registered for offering presenting also non-GAAP earnings 
in the prospectus (non-GAAP IPOs). Undoubtedly, the number of first unique activations for 
GAAP IPOs are higher than activations for non-GAAP IPOs registered in the two-year time 
horizon, because of the higher number of IPOs occurred. In particular, this is due to the number of 
GAAP IPOs registered in respect to non-GAAP IPOs, 452 against 239 respectively, in which non-
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GAAP IPOs are only the 35% of the IPOs sample. However, since anything relevant can be 
explained by counting the number of activations for each type of offering (GAAP or non-GAAP), 
ratios between the number of activations made by analysts (within two years from the offering) 
and the number of type of offering registered for each year are considered. In particular, ten ratios 
(one for each year) are calculated. These ratios proxy the degree of interest addressed to the type 
of offering by analysts, being either GAAP or non-GAAP offerings. According to the table, these 
relative ratios show different sizes over time for the two type of offerings (GAAP and non-GAAP).  
 
Table 2 – Number of analyst activations and degree of interest with regard to GAAP and non-GAAP IPOs  
  N 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
GAAP IPOs 
 
            
No. of activations 4073 239 876 549 728 647 104 106 229 216 379 
Degree of interest   7.24 8.85 8.58 8.99 8.86 11.56 10.6 8.48 9 11.84 
              
Non-GAAP IPOs 
 
            
No. of activations 2413 51 140 202 181 262 40 248 302 448 539 
Degree of interest   6.38 8.75 8.08 7.87 9.36 10 13.05 9.44 13.18 10.78 
              
Total activations 6486                     
 
Figure 2 displays better this relation, illustrating how analysts’ interest for GAAP and 
non-GAAP offerings varies over time. As it possible to notice, analysts’ interest for non-GAAP 
offerings (red line) is below the interest for GAAP ones (blue line) until 2006. It rises a bit in 2007, 
but lowers in 2008. However, after 2008, although with a decline in 2010, analysts’ interest 
addressed to non-GAAP IPOs remains above the interest addressed to GAAP IPOs. Finally, in 
2012 this trend changes by showing a decline for interest addressed to non-GAAP IPOs. Instead, 
the opposite effect is registered for analysts’ interest to GAAP IPOs in 2012. However, the situation 
after 2012 is not illustrated; therefore, it is unknown whether this trend persists. 
 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
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Table 3 summaries descriptive statistics for the variables days to coverage and number of unique 
active analysts covering the company grouped by the type of the offering (GAAP and non-GAAP 
IPOs). On average, analysts who covers non-GAAP IPOs tend to be active earlier than their peers 
covering GAAP IPOs, 191.23 trading days and 202.21 (about  11 trading days earlier), respectively. 
Moreover, on average, non-GAAP IPOs are followed by 10.10 analysts compared to 9.01 for 
GAAP IPOs (1 more). 
 
Table 3 – Summary statistics for days to coverage and number of active analysts 
  N Mean SD Min 25p Median 75p Max 
GAAP IPOs          
Days to coverage 4073 202.21 148.36 1 64 172 320 523 
No. active analysts 452 9.01 5.97 1 5 8 11 55 
           
Non-GAAP IPOs 
Days to coverage 2413 191.23 145.76 1 61 159 291 523 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 





















Interest for GAAP IPOs Interest for non-GAAP IPOs
Figure 10 - Analyst degree of interest for non-GAAP and GAAP IPOs 
 
















Figure 11 illustrates the graphical distribution of the variable days to coverage in a box 
plot depending on the two types of offering (GAAP and non-GAAP IPOs). This suggests that the 
median (50th percentile) for days to coverage for non-GAAP IPOs, as well as the 25th and 75th 
percentiles33, are below the level of median,  25th and 75th percentiles for GAAP IPOs. This 
indicates, as described in table 2, that analysts are active earlier when they start to cover non-GAAP 
IPO stocks over the two years sample horizon.  
                                                 
33 The 25th percentile is the lower line of the box and the 75th is defined by the upper line of the box. The 50th percentile 
(median) is defined by the middle line in each box. 
No. active analysts 239 10.1 5.75 1 6 9 12 33 
           
All IPOs          
Days to coverage 6486 198.12 147.48 1 62 166 314 523 
No. active analysts 691 9.39 5.91 1 6 8 11 55 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Figure 11 -Box plot of the distributions of forecasts over two-year time horizon 
 
Figure 8-Analyst activity for GAAP IPOs around the end of the quiet periodFigure 9-Box plot 
of the distributions of forecasts over two-year time horizonSource: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
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Figure 12 - Analyst activity for GAAP IPOs around the end of the quiet period 
 
Figure 14-Analyst activity for non-GAAP IPOs around the end of the quiet 
periodFigure 15-Analyst activity for GAAP IPOs around the end of the quiet 
periodSource: Personal elaboration 
 




























Figure 11 -Box plot of the distributions of forecasts over two-year time horizon 
 
Figure 10-Analyst activity for GAAP IPOs around the end of the quiet 
periodFigure 11-Box plot of the distributions of forecasts over two-year time 
horizon 
 
Figure 11 -Box plot of the distributions of forecasts over two-year time horizon 
 
Figure 12-Analyst activity for GAAP IPOs around the end of the quiet 




To investigate whether forecasts are concentrated around particular dates within the two-
year time horizon, days to coverage registered in the sample for each analyst (from 0 to 523 trading 
days) are sorted and the numbers of times in which the same days to coverage appear in the sample 
is counted. In this way, it is possible to show the absolute frequency of analyst activations in several 
time lengths from the date of the offering. In particular, it has been seen, how many days after the 
offering date the highest absolute frequency of activations occurs. This finding procedure suggests 
that for both GAAP and non-GAAP IPOs, analysts calculate EPS forecasts the most on the 29th 



































Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Figure 13 - Analyst activity for non-GAAP IPOs around the end of the quiet periodSource: 
Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
Figure 12 - Analyst activity for GAAP IPOs around the end of the quiet period 
 
Figure 16-Analyst activity for non-GAAP IPOs around the end of the quiet periodFigure 
17-Analyst activity for GAAP IPOs around the end of the quiet period 
 
Figure 12 - Analyst activity for GAAP IPOs around the end of the quiet period 
 
Figure 18-Analyst activity for non-GAAP IPOs around the end of the quiet periodFigure 














Interestingly, the 29th trading day correspond to the date of the end of the quiet period for 
the IPO company (40 calendar days after the offering). With this in mind, - 5 and +5 trading days 
after the 29th trading day after the offering have been. In particular, the bars graphs for GAAP and 
GAAP IPOs, respectively in figure 4 and 5, illustrate the activity of analysts around this particular 
day.  
As it possible to notice, in both figure 4 and 5, analyst activity is lower in days preceding 
the end of the quiet period. Indeed, analysts are active the most one trading day before and after 
the end of the quiet period. The highest peak occurs proper on the 29th trading day (371 activations 






























Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
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Figure 13 - Analyst activity for non-GAAP IPOs around the end of the quiet period 
 
Figure 13 - Analyst activity for non-GAAP IPOs around the end of the quiet period 
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3.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.3.1 UNIVARIATE TESTS  
The hypothesis examined is whether the presence of non-GAAP earnings in the prospectus 
influences the forecast timing for analysts who calculate EPS forecasts for fiscal years after the 
offering. In particular, the tested hypothesis is whether analysts covering non-GAAP IPO firms 
disclose forecasts earlier than analysts covering only GAAP IPOs. 
To test this hypothesis, the variable analyst ranking is defined in order to conduct the 
analysis. In particular, analyst ranking is the variable that ranks analysts from the earliest to the 
latest depending on the date in which they are active for the first time. In particular, the earliest 
(latest) analyst is the analyst whose days to coverage are lower (higher) compared to other analysts 
having higher (lower) position in the ranking for the same IPO firm. In this study, analyst ranking 
goes from one to ten, where ranking one pools earliest analysts and ranking ten pools latest analysts. 
In this setting, analyst ranking serves as tool to examine whether the variable days to coverage 
shows difference in mean given the variable NONGAAP. To start, days to coverage for analysts in 
ranking one are tested to see whether they present significant difference in mean, if they are 
grouped by the variable NONGAAP. Afterwards, the same procedure is made for differences in 
mean days to coverage for analysts in ranking two, and so on, up to days to coverage for analysts 
in ranking ten.  
Table 4 shows statistical t-tests for the procedure just described within two year time 
horizon after the offering. In particular, the first column piles analyst ranking from one to ten. Then, 
the second column piles the number of companies that are covered at least by the number of 
analysts present in the ranking in the same row. As it possible to notice, when ranking rises the 
number of companies decreases. In other words, in the first row, 691 companies (all companies 
present in the sample) are covered at least by one analyst. Instead, the last row suggests that 263 
IPO companies are covered at least by 10 analysts. Logically when ranking rises the mean for days 
to coverage (average number of trading days before the analyst becomes active) rises due to 
activation dates for analyst that are more distant from the date of the offering. According to table 






Table 4 - Univariate test for differences in mean for days to coverage within two years from the offering 
  
 
  GAAP    Non- GAAP  Test of differences 
Ranking 
 
N n Mean SD 25th Median 75th n Mean SD 25th Median 75th Difference t-test   
1 
 
691 452 61.80 56.82 29 30 85 239 64.08 53.90 29 30 99 -2.28 -0.511   
2 
 
682 444 82.93 69.70 29 61.5 115 238 84.41 62.96 29 63.5 134 -1.47 -0.272   
3 
 
668 433 102.81 79.86 31 85 148 235 100.32 79.15 29 81 144 2.49 0.386   
4 
 
644 416 141.49 106.36 47 115 195.5 228 122.83 100.76 36 108 166 18.66 2.169 ** 
5 
 
594 378 193.85 124.04 95 173.5 284 216 159.06 116.87 61 143.5 201.5 34.79 3.358 *** 
6 
 
523 330 239.28 135.31 126 236 334 193 181.94 122.04 81 159 258 57.33 4.845 *** 
7 
 
461 286 270.81 128.33 174 284 362 175 213.42 124.91 125 194 293 57.39 4.707 *** 
8 
 
395 245 291.19 127.73 211 305 388 150 238.61 124.79 151 234 331 52.58 4.005 *** 
9 
 
326 197 301.73 301.73 228 312 396 129 274.19 274.19 174 268 378 27.53 1.899 ** 
10 
 




Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
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In particular, in the first two rankings analysts who cover non-GAAP IPO securities tend, 
on average, to become active later than analysts who cover GAAP IPO stocks. Conversely, analysts 
who cover non-GAAP stocks and belong from the forth to the ninth ranking tend to become active 
for the first time before analysts who cover GAAP-stocks. This suggests that on average, for IPO 
firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings in the prospectus the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and 
ninth analyst in the ranking is active earlier than other analysts in the same ranking who cover 
GAAP IPOs.  As it possible to notice, the forth analyst who covers a non-GAAP IPO calculates 
his forecasts 18.66 earlier that his peer who cover a GAAP IPO. This is significant up to the ninth 
analyst in the ranking. 
The disclosure of non-GAAP earnings in the prospectus is likely to be influenced by the 
size of the firm (see Brown et al, 2016). Given that, it is opportune to investigate whether non-
GAAP IPO firms are larger in size than GAAP IPO firms. In particular, table 5 confirms the 
existence of difference in mean for size and suggests that in the sample non-GAAP disclosers are 
those IPO firms that are larger in term of size. Although, the full sample of IPOs comprises 691 
companies, only 644 companies present the measure of the size in the dataset (47 missing value 
for size).  
 
Table 5 - Univariate tests of difference in mean for size of IPO firms 
GAAP non-GAAP Test of difference 
N Mean SD N Mean SD Difference t-test 
422 291.11 1050.93 222 835.90 1859.97 -544.79 -4.75*** 
 
 
In this setting, by grouping IPO firms in GAAP and non-GAAP disclosers depending on 
their size, it is possible to test whether analysts from several rankings (from one to ten) react 
differently when deciding the timing of their forecasts. In this study, IPO firms are grouped within 
quartiles of the size and difference in mean are tested depending on the ranking of the analyst and 
the several quartiles for the size. However, table 6 shows that the number of non-GAAP IPO firms 
are less than GAAP IPOs in the first three quartiles. Interestingly, in the fourth quartiles the 
situation is opposite where there are 95 non-GAAP IPOs against 66 GAAP IPOs. Finally, as it 
possible to notice, moving from the first quartile to the second, then from the second to the third, 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
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until the fourth quartile, the percentage of non-GAAP IPOs in each quartile rises from 17.40% 
(quartile 1 for size) to 59.00% (quartile 4 for size).  
 
Table 6 - Composition of quartiles for size of IPO firms 
 
 
In this setting, further t-tests focus to verify the significance of the difference in mean in 
the timeliness of analyst activations between those analysts covering non-GAAP IPO stocks and 
those ones covering GAAP stock, but considering separately each quartile for size. From table 7, 
considering the first quartile for size, it emerges significant difference in mean in the sixth and 
seventh ranking. 
 
Table 7 - Univariate test of days to coverage within quartile 1 for size 




n Mean n Mean Difference t-test  
1 161 133 67.92 28 71.07 -3.15 -0.23  
2 153 126 97.18 27 100.33 -94.33 -0.17  
3 143 117 118.90 26 137.73 -18.83 -0.87  
4 134 110 162.74 24 157.75 4.99 0.18  
5 112 93 224.66 19 197.05 27.60 0.84  
6 88 74 269.77 14 201.57 68.20 1.88 ** 
7 78 64 314.47 14 265.28 49.19 1.38 * 
8 63 51 324.61 12 309.67 14.94 0.39  
9 44 37 328.67 7 348.14 -19.47 -0.38  
10 33 28 339.25 5 390.20 -50.95 -0.78  
 
Quartile for size  GAAP IPOs non-GAAP IPOs All IPOs 
1 133                     (82.60%)  28                       (17.40%) 161 
2 117                     (72.67%)  44                       (27.33%) 161 
3 106                     (65.84%)  55                       (34.16%) 161 
4 66                      (41.00%) 95                       (59.00%) 161 
Total 422                 222 644 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 




 In particular, 14 non-GAAP IPOs within the first quartile of size received coverage by the sixth 
and seventh analyst quicker than the other 74 GAAP IPOs. This means that the sixth and seventh 
analyst in the ranking who cover non-GAAP IPO stocks, on average, is active for the first time 
respectively 68.20 and 49.19 days before analysts covering GAAP stocks.  
Similarly, in table 8, difference in mean is significant from the fourth to the eighth ranking 
when considering the second quartile for the size of the firm. Therefore, the fourth analyst, and the 
following analysts, until the eighth analyst in the ranking, on average, cover non-GAAP IPO firms 
earlier for firms grouped within the second quartile.  
 
Table 8 - Univariate test of days to coverage within quartile 2 for size 
    GAAP IPOs non-GAAP IPOs Test of differences 
Ranking N n Mean n Mean 
Differen
ce 
t-test   
1 161 117 54.16 44 67.39 49.73 -1.5   
2 161 117 74.86 44 85.98 -11.11 -1.03   
3 160 116 99.43 44 92.89 6.54 0.5   
4 154 111 150.06 43 116.37 33.69 1.86 ** 
5 142 102 216.73 40 136.45 80.28 3.68 *** 
6 126 91 267.53 35 190.23 77.3 3.08 *** 
7 109 77 301.65 32 227.69 73.96 3.05 ** 
8 89 62 319.31 27 262.85 56.45 2.14 * 
9 75 51 336.55 24 307.13 29.42 1.04   
10 54 35 341.23 19 334.05 7.18 0.24   
 
 
 Somewhat different is present for those IPO firms grouped in the third quartile for the size. 
In particular, table 9 shows no significant difference in mean greater than zero, but rather an 
opposite effect of the variable NONGAAP suggesting that forecasts for non-GAAP IPOs by 
analysts are delayed. 
 
 Table 9 - Univariate test of days to coverage within quartile 3 for size 
  GAAP IPOs non-GAAP IPOs Test of differences 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elabo tion 
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Ranking N n Mean n Mean Difference t-test  
1 161 106 58.14 55 75.60 -17.46 -2.06  
2 161 106 77.51 55 91.65 -14.15 -1.59  
3 159 105 94.39 54 109.67 -15.28 -1.44  
4 155 102 126.35 53 134.74 -8.38 -0.51  
5 145 94 161.23 51 182.22 -20.98 -1.03  
6 133 87 208.43 46 210.91 -2.49 -0.11  
7 118 78 243.47 40 230.18 13.30 0.55  
8 106 70 266.39 36 263.53 2.86 0.11  
9 92 58 283.55 34 311.88 -28.33 -1.09  
10 73 47 301.34 26 319.31 -17.97 -0.65  
 
 
Interestingly, when considering the fourth quartile for the size, the earliest analyst, who 
belongs to the first ranking, starts to cover non-GAAP IPOs, on average, 17.03 days earlier than 
analysts covering GAAP IPOs. Furthermore, other significant differences in mean are present when 
considering the sixth, seventh and eighth analyst in the ranking. 
 
Table 10 - Univariate test of days to coverage within quartile 4 for size 
 
 
  GAAP IPOs non-GAAP IPOs Test of differences 
Ranking N n Mean n Mean Difference t-test  
1 161 66 74.97 95 57.94 17.03 1.84 ** 
2 161 66 88.11 95 78.37 9.74 0.92  
3 160 66 107.06 94 92.48 14.58 1.11  
4 156 64 127.31 92 114.37 12.94 0.85  
5 152 62 164.39 90 151.99 12.40 0.68  
6 140 58 213.02 82 156.11 56.91 2.61 *** 
7 123 49 228.53 74 181.24 47.29 2.12 ** 
8 111 45 256.31 66 211.17 45.14 1.75 ** 
9 94 37 257.95 57 236.96 20.98 0.72  
10 83 32 252.91 51 257.75 -4.84 -0.16  
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
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3.3.2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
To investigate better the magnitude of the main explanatory variable NONGAAP, which 
takes value 1 if the IPO firm discloses non-GAAP earnings in the prospectus and zero otherwise, 
a multivariate regression model is developed. In particular, it is tested whether non-GAAP 





Table 11 shows regression analysis conducted in a multivariate setting. Consistent with the 
supposed hypothesis, all four models show that IPO firms with non-GAAP earnings as additional 
Table 11-Multivariate regression analysis of days to coverage 
  
Regression of days to coverage     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 184.63 186.55 179.57 178.77 
t-statistic (3.47)*** (3.51)*** (3.36 )*** (-3.30  ) 
Non-GAAP -12.82 -10.38 -11.15 -8.69 
Dummy     
t-statistic (-2.96)*** (2.37)** (-2.54 ) ( -1.96 ) 
Loge (Size) -5.63 -6.41 -3.72 -1.56 
t-statistic (-1.91)* (-2.13) (-1.19 ) (-0.49 ) 
Underpricing  -10.07 -12.81 -12.34 
t-statistic  (-1.09) (-1.38) (-1.33) 
Shares offered   -0.23 -0.05 
t-statistics   (-3.32 ) (-0.60) 
Managers    -2.71 
t-statistic    (-3.94 ) 
Quartile Size YES YES YES YES 
Dummy     
Number of analysts YES YES YES YES 
Dummy     
     
     
     
Observations 6028 5881 5881 5881 
R-squared 0.0429 0.0441 0.0455 0.0479 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Figure 20-Analysis of various information gapsSource: Personal elaboration 
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information in the prospectus lowers the days before the first activation of analysts compared to 
only GAAP earnings IPOs. In particular, the coefficient of the dummy variable NONGAAP is 
significantly negative. This result suggests that analysts are active earlier in calculating their 
earnings forecasts for the first time (activation date) when IPO firms have a richer information 
prospectus, defined by non-GAAP earnings in the additional information of the Form S-1. Thus, 
voluntary disclosure, such as non-GAAP earnings influences the timing of forecasts. 
Model 1 includes the coefficients of the dummy variable NONGAAP and LOG_SIZE 
(logarithm of size). The coefficient of the variable NONGAAP is -12.82, suggesting that analyst 
are active nearly 13 days earlier when they start to cover non-GAAP IPOs stocks. Furthermore the 
coefficient of the variable LOG_SIZE is significant and negative (- 5.63), suggesting that larger 
firms are followed quicker by analysts.  
Model 2 includes also the coefficient of the variable UNDERPRICING equal to -10.07. 
This tells the more underpriced IPOs are followed earlier but analysts, but this relation is not 
statistically significant. The coefficients of the variables NONGAAP and LOG_SIZE are still 
negative and significant, respectively -10.38 and 6.41.  
Model 3 adds the coefficient of the variable SHARES_OFFERED. This is significant and 
equal to 0.23, but quite low to make predictions about the effect of the shares sold and timing of 
forecasts for analysts. However, the main variable NONGAAP is still significant and equals to -
11.15, whereas the coefficient for the variable LOG_SIZE is not significant anymore, even though 
negative.  
Model 4 adds the last control variable to the regression analysis. The variable MANAGERS 
gives the number of IPO managers (lead and co-underwriters) involved in the IPO process. 
Interestingly, IPO firms with more managers or investment bankers who sold shares to the public 
lowers days to coverage for analysts. In particular, the coefficient for the variable MANAGERS is 
significant and negative (-2.71). This suggests the attention for analysts for IPOs firms with a 
higher number of IPO managers, that it is reflected then in the timing of their forecasts.  
The goodness of fit, expressed by the R-squared, improves whenever a control variable is 
included in the model. In particular, it measures 4.30%, 4.41%, 4.55% and 4.80% for model 1, 
model 2, model 3 and model 4, respectively. Finally, models are fitted across 5881 observations, 
expect for model 1 fitted across 6028 observations. This is due to missing value for variables 
UNDERPRICING, SHARES_OFFERED and MANAGERS. Finally, in all four models, 
QUARTILE_SIZE and NUMBER_ANALYSTS are used as dummy control variables. The former 
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refers to the quartile the IPO belongs to with regard to its size, whereas the former refers to the 










The current study highlights the attention of analyst activity in the particular business 
situation of initial public offering (IPO) and when certain corporate information is provided in the 
IPO prospectus. Considering the particular nature of this market, being very volatile and risky, 
financial analysts may take advantage through looking at those securities on which they have 
relevant information, both private and public, in order to make their calculations of earnings 
forecasts. Logically, the larger the amount of information available to analysts the more accurate 
forecasts are. In particular, in this study, the situation in which IPO firms that disclose additional 
information in their prospectus was examined, by including, beyond GAAP earnings, also non-
GAAP earnings aimed at supplementing and improving the description of the actual performance 
of the company. This is an interesting and novel setting to investigate as more forthcoming 
corporate disclosure practice attract analysts’ attention on the stock (Lang & Lundholm, 1996). 
Although the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts is not examined, however it is provided a first 
evidence about the timing of forecasts for analysts conditional to the presence of non-GAAP 
earnings included in the prospectus at the end of Selected Financial Data section under the caption 
labeled “Other Financial Data”. 
The data shows that over a sample of 691 IPO firms, nearly 35% disclose non-GAAP 
earnings in the final prospectus. Through the conductance of univariate tests of differences it was 
found that the number of days before analysts calculate their first forecast is lower when analysts 
start to cover IPO firms that disclose non-GAAP earnings. In particular, IPO firms that disclose 
non-GAAP earnings are covered earlier by analysts that belong from the 4th to the 9th ranking, if 
not controlling for size. Moreover, when IPO firms are grouped accordingly to quartiles of sizes, 
the number of days before the first forecast was calculated by analysts in the first ranking are lower 
when analysts cover non-GAAP IPO stocks. 
If this study was to be replicated, it may be useful to investigate for the accuracy of forecasts 
made by analysts conditional to non-GAAP earnings information contained in the prospectus, as 
this is a variable that the current study did not control for. In particular, if the accuracy is higher 
when analysts calculate forecasts in dates close to the date of the offering, as analysts are likely to 





In conclusion, by conducting a regression analysis, the evidence suggests that non-GAAP 
earnings are capable to affect the timing of forecasts for analysts. Better stated, IPOs that disclose 
non-GAAP earnings receive coverage quicker and by a higher number of analysts. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis formulated in which the presence of non-GAAP earnings in the 
prospectus reduce the forecast window between the offer date and the date of the single analyst 
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